R. v. Grover

The Court — At trial, the respondent was convicted of attempting to obstruct justice contrary to s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code , R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 . The charge arose out of a fire that occurred on March 3, 2005 in residential premises owned by a numbered company, which he managed. The Crown alleged that the respondent attempted to alter and falsify records relating to the testing and maintenance of smoke alarms at the premises. In convicting the respondent, the trial judge held:

These documents were false in representing that the smoke alarms in the house were checked and tested on January 25th, 2005.

From all of the circumstances, I conclude that Mr. Grover knew that they were false.

. . .

. . . As I have said, I do not accept the evidence of Mr. Grover.

. . .

. . . Being aware of his own history of violations in connection with smoke alarms, being aware of the terrible consequences of this fire, being aware of his interview with fire inspector Farrell and police sergeant Ecklund, Mr. Grover was attempting to direct the focus of the fire investigation away from the smoke alarms in the house, and away from himself. He was attempting to avoid being charged with a violation or an offence, whether by the fire department or by the police service.

The respondent’s conviction was set aside by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal pursuant to s. 686(1) (a)(i) of the Criminal Code because, in the view of the majority, the verdict was not one that a properly instructed jury, acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered: R. v. Yebes, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 168, at p. 185. This conclusion was based on the view that the controversial actions of the accused after the fire were capable of more than one explanation. Of particular interest was a visit he had made to the hospital to try to see his tenants who were victims of the fire. The Crown argued that the purpose of the visit was to persuade the tenants to sign an inspection document that the respondent knew to be false. The trial judge accepted the tenant’s testimony that the respondent had asked her to sign a document indicating that the smoke alarms had been inspected. However, the majority in the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal said that the respondent’s conduct was equally consistent with the conclusion that the respondent, possibly ignorant of the fact that the required inspection had not in fact taken place, simply considered “it crucial that in this case the inspection records be in perfect order” ([2007] 5 W.W.R. 241, 2006 SKCA 146, at para. 14). Jackson J.A., dissenting, was of the view that:

As to whether there could be any other rational explanation for Mr. Grover’s actions, it is important to note that Mr. Grover testified. He said that he had attended at the hospital out of compassion for the victims. He did not say he went up to the hospital to have the tenants sign an incomplete form. Where the accused testifies and offers an explanation for his or her actions, which the trial judge then rejects, it is not the task of a court of appeal to come up with another rational explanation. [para. 26]

We agree. It was not open to the Court of Appeal to acquit the respondent on the basis of speculation about a possible explanation of his conduct that was flatly contradicted by his own testimony. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal is set aside and the conviction is restored.