Reasons for Judgment — Brown J. (Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Côté and Martin JJ. concurring)
Brown J. — We agree substantially with the majority at the Court of Appeal, and would dismiss the appeal. The trial judge’s analysis of the evidence reveals his path of reasoning that led to conviction, and permits effective appellate review.
Moreover, the trial judge did not err in his credibility analysis. He did not shift the burden of proof or hold the appellant’s evidence to a higher standard of scrutiny than that applied to the complainant’s evidence. As the majority at the Court of Appeal observed, the trial judge instructed himself on the principles of R. v. W. (D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, and, based on internal contradictions in the appellant’s testimony and on the strength of the complainant’s testimony, he was entitled to conclude that the Crown had met its burden of proving the appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nor did the trial judge err by applying generalizations and stereotypes in rejecting the appellant’s evidence. We agree with the majority at the Court of Appeal that the trial judge’s statements in this regard were directed to the appellant’s own evidence and to the believability of the appellant’s claims about how he responded to the specific circumstances of this case, and not to some stereotypical understanding of how men in those circumstances would conduct themselves.
Cases cited
- R. v. W.(D.) 22170-1991-03-28 ¶ 2