R. v. Gimson

Lamer C.J. ‑‑ We need not hear from you Mr. Reynolds and Mr. Frater. We are ready to hand down judgment now. Justice Iacobucci will deliver judgment for the Court.

//Iacobucci J.//

Iacobucci J. ‑‑ We do not call upon the respondent because this is not the proper case to address the question as to whether there is a blanket authorization to enter without a prior demand in drug searches.

This appeal, which comes to us as of right, involves the issuance of a search warrant to a police officer by a judge, pursuant to the provisions of the Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. N‑1, to search the appellant's dwelling house for cocaine. That is, a judge was satisfied, by information on oath, that there were reasonable and probable grounds for believing that there was cocaine in the appellant's dwelling house, and that the offence of possession of a narcotic for the purpose of trafficking had been committed in the dwelling house. These grounds were based on information that the police received from a reliable informant to the effect that the sale of narcotics was taking place in the dwelling house and that the front door might be barricaded, from which the police could infer that the occupant wished to have time to destroy any evidence. The legality of the warrant has not been challenged by the appellant.

It was recognized by this Court in R. v. Genest, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 59, at pp. 85‑86, following Eccles v. Bourque, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 739, at pp. 746‑47, that the police may enter a dwelling house without first announcing their presence if it is necessary to do so to prevent the destruction of evidence. We are all of the opinion that, under all the circumstances of this case, the police were entitled to enter the appellant's dwelling to execute their search warrant in order to prevent the destruction of evidence. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.