p. 270Thereupon the relator applied by motion to the supreme court for a peremptory writ of mandamus compelling the superintendent to issue a certificate of authority to relator to effect marine insurances in the state of New York. The court at special term, on April 13,1882, denied the relators motion for a mandamus, Avhich denial was subsequently affirmed on appeal, at a general term in the supreme court for the third department on February 10, 1883, and on the further appeal, by the court of appeals, on May 8, 1883. Neither the supreme court at general term nor the court of appeals rendered any further opinion than that reported below.
Edward D. McCarthy and Robert Ludlow Fowler, for relator and appellant.
I. The writ of mandamus is the
appropriate remedy (People
ex rel. Lawrence
v. Supervisors of Westchester,
73 N. Y. 173 ; People
ex rel. Schenectady Astron. Observ. v. Allen, 42
Id. 404). The superintendent’s duty is ministerial, not judicial, as he has no discretion in this case
(Laws 1859, c. 366 ;
Laws 1853, c. 466, § 23, amended 1862, c. 367, § 5;
Laws 1849, as modified by Laws, 1853, c. 463, § 22;
Laws 1859, c. 366, §§ 3, 8).
II. The relator was admitted into this State prior to 1873, and in construing the original license to relator, it must be assumed that the business of insurance was a valid business recognized by the common law. Any statute regarding the original license, its duration and effect must be construed in reference to the principles of the common law (
People ex rel. Osterhout v. Perry, 13 Barb. 206 ). The fact that the relator was required to file an annual statement and to take out a renewal certificate of authority did not define the duration of the original license to relator. The original license to do business, being for an indefinite time, was for the period of relator’s corporate existence or until the State by a general law shall otherwise limit the license.
p. 271III. The relator’s charter enabling it to effect both fire and marine insurances, in so far as'these chartered powers are consistent with the domestic policy of this State, the relator is entitled to have such chartered power recognized and protected by comity (
Merrick v. Van Santvoord, 34 N. Y. 208 ).
IV. There is no manifestation of any policy on the part of the State to exclude foreign corporations simply because they effect both fire and marine insurances. The court should not imply such a policy from c. 490, Laws of 1879, acts relating to domestic insurance corporations only (Oakley 0. Aspinwall,
3 N. Y. 547 , 568). This would be to prohibit by inference a foreign corporation from pursuing a valid common law business, in this State. The principle of sovereignty has not gone so far as to raise a principle of exclusion by inference.
V. Chapter 593 of the Laws of 1873, conferring power on the superintendent in his judgment to refuse admission to any insurance corporation of another State, when such refusal shall best promote the interest of the people of this State, has no relation to the status of relator, as it was admitted prior to the passage of this act.
VI. Chapter 593 of the Laws of 1873 is in any event unconstitutional, because it delegates a legislative power to the superintendent of the insurance department (
Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483 , 491, 492; Bradley
v. Baxter, 15
Barb. 123 ).
Austin A. Yates, for respondent Fairman (superintendent Of insurance).
I. The issuance or refusal of a certificate or a renewal certificate of authority is a matter of discretion with the superintendent of insurance {Laws 1853, c. 463, § 22 ; Id. c. 466, § 28 ; Laws 1873, c. 593, § 2). Mandamus can compel action,' but it cannot control discretion (Hutchinson v. Comm’r of Canal
p. 272II. The relator was not admitted to do business in this State, for more than one year (vide Hartford Life and Ann. Ins. Co. v. Fairman,' decided special term, September, 1882); but even if it was originally admitted for a longer term the relator voluntarily retired from this State in 1872, and when it was re-admitted in-1873, it was only permitted to do fire insurance business, and it has never since effected marine risks.
* III. The doctrine of comity will not admit this company to do a class of business prohibited to New York corporations by the statute of New York. The admission of foreign insurance companies is an act of indulgence (Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 166 ) and not of right.
IV. The superintendent is forbidden by law (Laws 1879, c. 490, § 2) to issue the certificate sought.
The superintendent of insurance upon the application of the relator considered its request to be permitted to do a marine insurance business within this State and refused it. If a mandamus would lie against the superintendent in a matter of this nature, it would be to compel him to consider the relator’s application and act upon it. The mandamus is therefore not necessary. Whether the determination of the superintendent upon the petition, and the facts applicable thereto, may be reviewed by this court upon certiorari or appeal is a question not now before us.
Motion for mandamus denied, with costs.