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Kelly v. Moore

18 Abb. N. Cas. 468 Court N. Y. Supreme Court, First District, Chambers; English

Delivered by Barrett, J.

Contents

Majority

p. 468
KELLY v. MOORE.
N. Y. Supreme Court, First District, Chambers;
January, 1887.

Headnote

1. Exempt property allowed to widow.] Under the act of 1874 (Z. 1874, c. 470) amending the Revised Statutes ( 2 B. 8 .83, § 0), the widow of a decedent is entitled, in,addition to the specified articles and “ other necessary household furniture not exceeding $150 in value,” allowed by the act of 1842 (Z. 1842, c. 157), to other household furniture not exceeding $150 in value, or the sum of $150 in lieu thereof.[1]
Motion to amend decree of distribution in partition.
James Moore died intestate, seized of lands in the city of New York, leaving him surviving his widow, the defendant Moore, and two sisters, and children of a deceased sister. The widow received such household furniture as was owned by the deceased. She was appointed administratrix, but upon the official appraisement no allowance was made to her as widow beyond the household furniture, nor upon her accounting as administratrix, her claim having
p. 469
been overlooked. In this action for partition of said real estate, after payment of the debts of the deceased as provided by the decree, there remained a small balance in the jiands of the referee, and this motion was now made in her behalf to amend the decree by directing payment to her of $150, upon the ground that she was entitled under the statute to that sum additional to the household property which by law was set aside for her as the widow of the deceased.
David Thornton (Thornton, Earle & Kiendl, attorneys), ■for the plaintiff, contended, that in the absence of “other •household furniture,” the widow was entitled to $150 in money in lieu thereof, as provided by L. 1874, c. 470.
James M. Fish, for the defendant heirs, and others.

Mr. Thornton is right in his contention that the exemption of household furniture not exceeding $150 in value, under the act 1874, is in addition to tliatof the same amount of personal property under the act of 1842. And the “set-off’’ may he in money. The authorities cited support this view (see Redfield Surrogate's Pr. 2 ed. 412, note 1, and 413, note 3; and Matter of Miller, 1 Monthly Law Bul. 48).

Motion granted.