Majority
Headnote
1. Taxes; collateral inheritance tax; exemptions.] A legacy to a> college, incorporated and located in another State, is not exempt from taxation under the collateral inheritance act, although by statute of that State its property is exempted from taxation.The question to be answered in this proceeding involves the construction to be given to the-Collateral TaxAct[1] in respect of liability to the tax on gifts, legacies, etc., passing by the will of a resident of this State to “the societies, corporations and institutions now exempted by law -from taxation,” where, as in -this proceeding, such “ corporation,” is a non-resident, created by the statute law of a foreign State, and by such statute law exempted from taxation.
To present the question sharply, it may be admitted that if the legacy by the will of this decedent had passed to a corporation similar to this legatee, resident in this State, and organized and existing under and in pursuance of the law» of this State, the legacy would not be subject to the tax.
† † L. 1886, c. 483.
Did the legislature intend to include such foreign corporations in the exempted class named in section 1 of the ■act under consideration ? I am unable to so hold.
I have given a deal of time to the consideration of this Collateral Tax Act and have been much annoyed and puzzled by its provisions. That part of it bearing upon the question here has tormented me not a little. I am greatly gratified that the appellate court has at last this precise question before it, most ably and fully «argued on both sides. I refer to the case of Catlin, ex’r, v. Trustees of Trinity College ;[2] now awaiting the decision of the General Term of the Second Department. ETo doubt we shall in due time have the decision of the court of appeals in that case, which will instruct and enlighten us all, and set at rest all the doubtful and perplexing questions arising under this wretchedly drawn act. Very much has been said, and well said, in the argument and able briefs submitted to me in this proceeding, and I am frank to say that the more I hear and the more I read and study the act and the numerous authorities cited pro and con, the more uncertain I am. I have, however, reached a conclusion which seems to me just and lawful.
Statutes should be strictly construed in my judgment, always at least by trial courts. Interpolating words, or -striking them out, in order to square the act with the construction given, perverting the ordinary meaning of language used, by enlarging or restricting it, if ever allowable, should not be resorted to by a court of first impression. ■Such liberty taken with a statute is akin to legislation ; and, I need not suggest, the courts are absolutely prohibited from exercising legislative functions. This statute should be, in my view, strictly construed for another reason, not only by me, but by courts of appellate jurisdiction, because it is claimed here that its provisions mean that the property
* Reported page 28 of this vol.
Comity between States certainly does not help this legatee. Comity means, generally, reciprocity ; and there are no reciprocal relations on this subject between Mew York and Massachusetts. The notion that a foreign corporation of a glass “ exempted ” by our laws from taxation shall therefore be entitled to receive rich endowments by the will of a resident of this State, whose accumulations were made under the protection of our laws, and thus making it possible for him to make the gift, without taking therefrom a duty and tax to be used toward the expense of maintaining our State government, is to me repugnant to every consideration of natural justice and violative of all rules of common sense. Statute law, however, is too often in the very face of both.
All property within the jurisdiction of this State maybe subjected to tax. All is subject to tax except it be exempted therefrom ; and no authority need be cited for this proposition, nor for this: that every statute of exemption must be strictly construed. Our own court of appeals has given us a plain, just and sensible rule many times over for our guidance in construing all statutes, viz.: “In construing any statute, the intention of the lawmakers must be sought for. That is the grand central light in which all statutes must be read The intention, however, is to be s’ought'for in the language used; but for the- purpose of understanding the language, the object the lawmakers had in view and the motives which moved them to -enact the law may be considered ” (Hudson Iron Co. v. Alger, 54 N. Y. 173 -175).
I hold that this language plainly imports the intention of the lawmakers to be that corporations, etc., “ exempted by law,” are all corporations named specifically or by general description in our statutes as exempted. A foreign corporation cannot claim, of course, to be “ exempted ” from taxation by express provision of our laws. It is only such corporations as are the creatures of our laws, created by them and subject thereto,, even the repeal of their charters being possible by our legislature, their very life dependent upon the will and pleasure of the law-making power, that are intended to be relieved from the payment of this tax. It is such corporations that are “ exempted.” If the lawmakers had said “ the societies, corporations, etc., now exempt by law,” etc., it might have been more plausibly argued that it was the intention of the lawmakers to exempt all corporations, wheresoever organized and existing, of the same class as those organized and existing under our own statutes, the property of which, by the terms of the act, is not subject to taxation. The question is, wliat property is subject to the tax? Certain named societies and corporations now (at the taking effect of the act) exempted by law shall not be liable to the tax or, to speak more precisely, property passing by will, etc., to them shall not be
To my mind, this legatee is bound to pay this tax by the plain provisions of the act: and above and beyond that, by obligations founded upon the plain, simple principles of fair play and even justice.
Let an order confirming the report of the appraiser be handed up.
Cases cited
- Hudson Iron Co. v. Alger 54 N. Y. 173 p. 22