Majority
Headnote
1. Service of process; exemption of non-resident party.] Although it seems that a non-resident is privileged from the service of summons in this State while here attending upon the taking of a deposition to be used in an action pending against him in the State of his residence, yet his privilege is lost by remaining in this State an unreasonable and unnecessary length of time.I am not prepared to follow, in all particulars, the doctrine of Greer v. Young[2] ( 120 Ill. 184 ). The courts of this State have gone very far in protecting parties and witnesses attending here upon a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. If Galigher had really come here to protect his interests in the taking of testimony to be used against him in Illinois, I think the principle enunciated in the cases in this State is broad enough to protect him eundo, morando et redeimdo.
The. proofs, however, overwhelmingly establish the fact that Galigher remained here longer than was necessary after he determined to have nothing more to do with the examination. Upon September 25th he expressed his intention not to return, before the notary public, and he then remained for but a few minutes, taking no part in the proceedings. He was not served until the afternoon of the 27th. Thus he had the afternoon and night of the 25tli, the whole of the 26th and the morning of the 27th to return to his home. His privilege was lost by remaining within this State an unreasonable and unnecessary length of time. The proofs show, indeed, that his presence here had no real relation to the examination of witnesses. He was here partly for his own pleasure, and partly for ulterior objects.
The motions to set aside the service of summons should therefore be denied, with $10 costs in each case.
* Code Civ. Pro. § 315.
Footnotes
- * In Greer v. Young, 120 Ill. 184 , a resident of Missouri was served with summons in Illinois, while in that State for the sole purpose of assisting his attorneys in taking depositions therein for use in an action then pending in Missouri against him for the same cause of action, and it was held that he was not privileged from the service of summons in *408 ■such case, first, because the rule of the common law which exempted from arrest on civil process did not apply where the service was simply by reading, and second, because the proceeding before the notary could not be regarded as a proceeding in court. Upon the first ground above taken, the court admitted that the rule had been extended to service of summons by the courts of New York, citing Person v. Grier, 66 N. Y. 124 , and Matthews v. Tufts, 87 Id. 568.
- † † Compare L. 1884, c. 346, § 1, and Code Civ. Pro. § 838.