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In re Opening Rogers Avenue

29 Abb. N. Cas. 361 Court N. Y. Supreme Court, Special Term, Kings County ; English

Delivered by Cullen J.

Contents

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MATTER OF OPENING ROGERS AVENUE.
N. Y. Supreme Court, Special Term, Kings County ;
December, 1885.

Headnote

1. Highways; special statute.] Upon motion to confirm the report of commissioners of estimate and appraisement in the opening of a street appointed under L. 1871, c. 567—which provides for the opening of roads in the town of Flatbush—the court should regard the report, so far as matters of fact are involved, with the same favor as the verdict of a jury ; to impeach it, it must affirmatively and clearly be shown to be against evidence.
2. The same.] Under a statute (Act for the Opening of Streets in the Town of Flatbush, L. 1871, c. 567, § 12), limiting the district of assessment to the center of the block between the street opened, and the street next adjoining thereon, the fair general rule is to assess the cost of the land taken for each block of the street, upon the property fronting upon such block.
3. The same.] One whose land is taken for a municipal local improvement, has a constitutional right to allowance of compensation for buildings he has erected thereon, intermediate the filing of the plan and the opening of the street.
4. Constitutional law; private propertyi\ Laws 1869,0.670,—pro-viding that the supervisors of certain towns in Kings County may make plans for streets in their respective towns, and that if any building shall be erected on the line of any street as laid out on a plan so made, after the filing of a map thereof, no compensation shall be paid the owner of the building on the opening of the street,—deprives the owner of the right to improve his property, without compensation therefor being ascertained by a jury or commissioners appointed by a court of record, and is unconstitutional.
Matter of Furman street, 17 Wend. 649 , distinguished, and dictwn Matter of One Hundred and Twenty-seventh street, 56 How. Pr. 60 , disapproved.
Motion by Commissioners of Estimate and Appraisement, appointed under L. 1891, c. 567—an act providing for the opening of new roads in the town of Flatbush— for confirmation of their report awarding to certain
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owners and parties interested, the amounts due them for the taking of their land in opening of a street, and assessing the expenses, for the opening of such street on the-property liable therefor.
F. E. Dana, for the motion.
William J. Gaynor, opposed.

The report of the commissioners of estimate and appraisement, so far.as matters of fact are involved, is viewed with the same favor as the verdict of a jury. To impreach it, it must affirmatively and clearly be shown to be against the evidence (Matter of Furman street, 17 Wend. 603 ; Matter of John and Cherry streets, 19 Id. 659 ). Here such fact does not appear, and therefore the court will only review the principles or rules upon which the commissioners act. As to the assessment, I can find no error. The statute limits the district of assessment to the centre of the block between the street opened and the street next adjoining thereon ; unless the-Broad of Improvement determine in its resolution torn ake the improvement, to extend such district. No such determination was made in this case. The existence of Prospect street and its adoption on the permanent plan,, I think is established. The commissioners, therefore, rightly determined the distance of assessment. The rule adopted by them was to assess the cost of the land taken for each block of the street upon the property fronting upon such block, or in other words, to make each block pay for the land taken for such block. This rule not only seems to me fair in principle, but has been the one adopted in every street-opening that has come under my observation. While it is easy to suggest cases in which it might be inapplicable, I do not see that this case is taken out of the general rule.

The awards to Morran and Tierney are objected to by those owners because the commissioners have allowed no

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compensation for buildings or parts thereof lying within the limits of the street opened by these proceedings. The • fact is admitted, and the action of the commissioners is defended, on the ground that the act of 1869, chapter 670, for the appointment of commissioners to lay out a plan for roads and streets in the county of Kings, directs-that if any buildings shall be erected on the line of any avenue or street, as laid out on said plan, after, the filing of the map thereof, no compensation shall be paid to the owner thereof tfpon the opening of the street. If this provision be valid, the action of the commissioners is-justified, but the objectors claim that the provision is unconstitutional and void.

Provisions similar to the one in question are common. Their validity has been challenged, but the precise point apparently decided in only two reported cases, in both of which they were upheld (Matter of Furman street, 17 Wend. 649 ; Matter of One Hundred and Twenty-seventh street, 50 How. Pr. 60 ). The former case arose in the City of Brooklyn. Though the case arose in 1836, the statute laying out the streets and containing the provisions complained of was passed in 1816. Justice BRONSON upheld the validity of this provision on two grounds r First, that at the time of the passage of the act there was no inhibition in the constitution of the-State against taking private property without compensation. Second, that the landowner received compensation through the enhanced value of his lands, by reason of the adoption of the general . plan of streets. The second case arose in the City of New York, but the street opened was laid out by an act passed in 1813,-which directed that the compensation should be made for buildings, subsequently erected on the street. The decision of the Furman street case is said to have been approved by the court of errors in 1843, in the case of Jackson v. Mayor of Brooklyn and Silliman v. Same (not reported) on the ground that the prohibition was constitutional, because it did indirectly provide full

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compensation by the conversion of county farms into •city lots (See opinion Matter of Wall street, 17 Barb. 6 17 ). But the validity of the act under examination, in this case passed since the constitution of 1846, can be upheld on neither of the grounds of the decision of Judge Bronson, nor of the court of errors. Private property cannot be taken without compensation, and where the compensation is not made by the State, it must be determined by a jury or commissioners, appointed by a court of record. This is not a case where compensation is made by the .State, nor is it a State improvement (Sage v. City of Brooklyn, 89 N. Y. 189 ). Therefore, if the increase of the value of his property is compensation for the deprivation of the unrestricted right to use the land, intermediate the adoption of the plan and the opening of the street, it is so solely by the fiat of the legislature. But if it were actually the fact, neither the legislature nor the courts, under the constitution of 1846, are competent to ascertain it. That must be done by a jury, or by commissioners .appointed by a court of record (Matter of Middletown, 82 N. Y. 196 ; Menges v. City of Albany, 56 Id. 374).

The case of One Hundred and Twenty-seventh street was doubtless well decided if it considered the act of 1813 and filing the map thereunder worked a limited appropriation of the land as of such time. But the opinion of Justice Daniels placed his decision not only on that ground, but goes to the extent of holding that this restriction on the right to place buildings upon the line of future highways, is not taking property. I cannot assent to this contention. All the cases cited, save this, conceded that the restriction is a taking of the land to a certain extent. It may well be that the only purpose for which the land can possibly be used is for the erection of buildings. It is said by Judge Earl in re Jacobs ( 98 N. Y. 98 ) : “ One may be deprived of his liberty and his constitutional right thereto violated, without the actual restraint of his person. Liberty in its broad sense, as

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understood in this country, means not only the right of freedom from servitude, or restraint, or imprisonment, but the right of one to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to earn his livelihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or vocation.” So the right to property includes the right to use that property for any lawful purpose of profit to the owner (People v. Marx, 3 Crim. R. 200). Whenever that right is restricted, property is taken within the meaning of the constitution. Doubtless, all property is subject to the police power of the State, and to the rule sic utere tuo, etc. But, palpably, an enactment that one shall not improve his property, in order that in case the public should acquire it, it may purchase it cheap, is no exercise of the police power. There is no provision in the act of 1869 for compensating the owner for this deprivation of the right to use his land. In my opinion, therefore, the direction contained in that act, that he shall receive nothing for his building, is void. I do not say that when a highway is laid out, and provision made for its speedy and certain opening, buildings could be erected to enhance the damages. But there is no direction to open the streets laid out under the act of 1869. The opening of such streets is entirely discretionary with the various town authorities. Decades not only may, but doubtless will, elapse before the majority of such streets are opened. Even in the case of One Hundred and Twenty-seventh street, New York, cited above, over sixty years intervened between the laying out of the street and the compensation to the owners of the land.

The report must be sent back to the qommissioners, with instructions to estimate and allow for the damages to buildings on the line of the street, and to modify their awards and assessments accordingly.

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