Goldsmith v. Coverly

The burden of proof necessarily rested upon the plaintiff to establish a com

The only evidence presented by him for that purpose was his own testimony, which, if true, was sufficient to require a verdict in his favor. The court, assuming it to be true, directed a verdict in his behalf for the sum of $7,088.77. The defendants, having asked for leave to go to the jury on the issues presented, now contend that it was error for the court to direct a verdict against them, and the reason assigned is that, in view of the fact that the only evidence offered in support of plaintiff’s claim was that of a party to the action, whose testimony it is urged was to some extent discredited by his own answers on cross-examination, the question as to the truthfulness of his evidence was for the jury ; that the court could direct the jury to find a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the event that they should believe his testimony to be true, but that it had no right to direct them to believe him.

The early rule denied the competency of a party to the record to testify as a witness.

Subsequently, this rule was changed by statute, which has since become incorporated in the Code of Civil Procedure (§ 828). But ever since parties to an action were qualified by statute to testify as witnesses in their own behalf, a distinction has been uniformly observed between their testimony and that of wholly disinterested witnesses. While the testimony of disinterested witnesses who are neither impeached nor discredited must be credited, that of witnesses who are parties to the action, by reason of their interest in the result, is ordinarily to be considered by a jury, in order that they may determine what effect, if any, their interest in the result of the controversy should have upon their credibility.

And it has been held many times that, although the testimony of a party to an action be uncontradicted, his interest presents a question as to credibility, which the jury must' pass upon (Honegger v. Wettstein, 94 N. Y.

In actions where corporations are parties, the same rule has been applied to the testimony of its officers (Canajoharie National Bank v. Diefendorf, 123 N. Y. 191 -200; Joy v. Diefendorf, 130 Id. 6).

The case which tends more strongly to support the ■decision made than any other is Kelly v. Burroughs ( 102 N. Y. 93 ). In that case the defendant was the first and plaintiff the second indorser on a note made by one Evans. From the statement of facts we quote : “ Defendant then testified that he indorsed the note at the request and for the accommodation of Evans, the maker, and returned it to him ; that the plaintiff procured the note, to be discounted, had the money placed to his own credit, and on the same day drew the money. The plaintiff then testified that he indorsed the note and procured it to be discounted at the request of the maker, and gave the proceeds to him. Other evidence was given to the same effect.” It is apparent, therefore, that to some extent, at least, the plaintiff was corroborated. How fully, the report of the case does not inform us, but it appears from the statement of the case that it was in substantial respects. The court held there was no question for the jury, saying, the “mere fact that the plaintiff, who testified to important particulars, was interested, was unimportant, in view of the fact that there was no conflict in the evidence, or any thing or circumstance from which an inference against the fact testified to by him could be drawn.”

It will be observed that neither in the statement of facts nor in the opinion of the court does it appear that plaintiff’s recovery was based solely upon testimony given by himself.

But if we assume that the fact was otherwise, and that the authority of Kelly’s case has not been impaired by the

The defendants relied, whether wisely or not is of no moment in the present discussion, upon the plaintiff’s testimony and his books and papers covering the period in dispute, to show that he had failed to keep his part of the-agreement not to ship cattle to the ports named therein by other than the agreed steamship lines. In order that the books and papers should be made available for such purpose on the trial, the plaintiff was duly subpoenaed to produce such of them as covered the period from December 31, 1888, to January 1, 1890.

He did not produce them, assigning as a reason that the books were lost or destroyed and the bookkeeper dead.

We quote from his cross-examination some of the answers made by him to inquiries with reference to them : “ Q. And you have no books back of 1891 ? A. No,. Q. Where were the books which covered this period as to which we are all interested, when you saw them last ? A. I can’t remember. Q. What is the name of your bookkeeper? A. That man I had at that time is dead now ; he died last year. It is not quite twelve months since he died ; I guess it is about—I can’t remember exactly—nine or ten months. His name was Michael Epstein. Q. How many books do you think there were that related to your business, covering this period in question, when you last saw them ? A. I can’t remember. Q, You did a pretty large business? A. I know that. Q. How many thousands of dollars’, worth of cattle do you suppose you shipped, in which you were interested, directly or indi

The defendant, evidently with the idea that plaintiff’s bank account and checks would furnish evidence of payments to other lines for the shipment of cattle, inquired of him in what banks he kept his accounts for the year 1889. With what success the following questions and answers which fairly measure it will disclose: “ Q. Did you keep more than one bank account during the year 1889 ? A. I can’t remember; I kept one ; I caffit tell you ; we have got two bank accounts ; I don’t know where we generally put the money in ; I can’t remember exactly. I didn’t draw checks, I only signed them. £?- Can you tell this jury the name of any bank in which you.

It was, at least, quite remarkable that the plaintiff, who was the largest shipper of live cattle from the port of New York, and who during the year 1889 shipped between ■60,000 and 70,000 head of cattle from that port to Liverpool, London, Glasgow and Hull, should, within a short time thereafter, permit the books showing all these transactions to be lost or destroyed under the circumstances testified to by him.

The care which he says he took of them was not such ■as would ordinarily be 0expected of a reasonably prudent ■man engaged in business of such magnitude. Clearly, the jury should have been permitted to say, in view of the character of his answers to defendant’s inquiries on cross-examination, of which we have given specimens merely, whether they believed his testimony in such respect. And if the conclusion should have been reached that his testimony in that regard was untrue, they would have been at liberty to disregard the rest of his evidence.

In addition, the defendants produced two witnesses, who were shipping agents of other lines, who testified that in the year 1889 they had seen plaintiff’s foreman, Mr. Hirsch, oh several occasions superintending the loading of ■cattle on boats belonging to their lines.

In view of the general rule which obtains when the testimony of a party is wholly uncorroborated, coupled with the improbability of many of the plaintiff’s statements, the defendants were clearly entitled to have the jury pass upon his credibility. It was for them to say, after weighing the entire testimony in the light of the -witness’s interest in the result, whether they believed that

The judgment should be reversed, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.

Van Brunt, P. J., concurred.

The circumstances disclosed by the-record made the credibility of the plaintiff a question for the jury, and the court erred in directing a verdict; but 1 am not prepared to hold that the credibility of a party must, in all cases, be submitted to the jury. In case the testimony of a party is wholly uncontradicted, is not improbable on its face, and there is no circumstance which tends to discredit the credibility of a party or the testimony given, the court may direct a verdict based on such testimony (Lomer v. Meeker, 25 N. Y. 361 ; Kelly v. Burroughs, 102 Id. 93).

I do not understand that the Court of Appeals has laid down as a general rule that in all cases the credibility of a party or of a witness interested in the event of the action must be submitted to the jury, but in the particular cases considered it was held that the credibility of the party or of the interested witness should have been submitted to the jury.

Judgment reversed, with costs to the appellant to-abide the event.

Note on the Value of the Testimony of an Interested Witness.

This case and the one following manifest very clearly-the diversity of judicial opinion,—which has existed ever since the disqualification of interest was removed,—in respect to the value of the testimony of an interested witness. The great importance of the question results from the fact that frequently the question on the trial of a cause whether it is to be decided by the judge or by the jury must depend on the view that is taken of tin’s point.

This element of importance does not exist in the second.

In a proper consideration of this question we should not overlook the fundamental principle that a substantial question of credibility, whether created by a direct conflict in testimony, or by the fact that the sole testimony on an ■essential point is that of a witness who has been impeached, makes a question for the jury. The point to be considered is whether the testimony of a party or of an interested witness, where it is the only evidence on an essential point, ■ought always to be submitted to the jury and not made the basis of a binding direction of a verdict.

In considering this point it should be observed that under settled practice which allows an action to be brought In his own name by the trustee of an express trust (including a person who makes a contract for the benefit of another), the party in many cases may have no real interest and the beneficiary as a witness may have all the interest which a party suing for his own'benefit could have. This important fact has been already made the ground of a substantial change in the rulings under § 829 of the Code, it now being held that the words of that section “ a party or person interested in the event ” do not include a party to the record who has no interest in the event.

Another point to be observed is the question whether interest in the event for the purpose of determining the value of the testimony of a witness should be considered as including only a legal interest therein (i. e., such a relation to the ■cause that the witness may gain a legal right or come under a legal liability by a judgment in the cause, o'r may use the judgment as evidence in future litigation), or whether it should include witnesses having bias merely, a kind of interest which doubtless occasionally amounts to a motive quite as strong as a legal interest, but which is so common in weaker and very slight degrees. For the previous authorities on this subject, 28 Abb. N. C, 211 , and addenda.