Majority
Headnote
Adjoining Ownebs.—Constbdction of L. 1855, c. 6.—Contbactob. —Excavations in New Yobk City and Bbooklyn.The plaintiff’s testatrix, and the defendant in 1872,.were respectively owners of adjoining houses and lots, in the city of New York. In March of that year, the defendant, desiring to deepen the cellar of his house, and rebuild the cellar walls, made a contract with one Sullivan to furnish the materials and perform the work. The plan of the improvements made it necessary to excavate below the existing foundation wall of the defendant’s house, and more than ten feet below the street curb.
The foundation wall of the house of the plaintiff’s testatrix extended about ten feet below the surface of her lot. The excavation made by the defendant caused the wall of the plaintiff’s testatrix to settle, and this
By the common law, an owner of land contiguous to the land of another upon which a building is erected, is not bound to protect the owner of the building against injuries which may result thereto from excavations on his own land, in the absence of any right by prescription or grant in the owner of the building, to have it supported by the land of the person making the excavation.
The material right of support, as between the owners of contiguous lands, exists in respect of lands only, and not in respect of buildings, or erections thereon (Panton v. Holland, 17 Johns. 92 ; Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass. 221 ; Humphrey v. Boyden, 12 Q. B. 139; Goddard on Easements, 31). The owner of land, however, in making an excavation on his own premises, which may endanger a building on his neighbor’s land, is bound to use reasonable care in the prosecution of the work, and is liable for consequent injuries to his neighbor’s property resulting from his negligence (Panton v. Holland, supra; Dodd v. Holmes, 1 Add. & El. 493; Foley Wyeth, 2 Allen, 131 ). But he is under no obligation to shore up his neighbor’s house, nor is there any duty arising from contiguity merely that he should give his neighbor notice of his intention to excavate on his own premises (2 Washb. on Easements, 444; Trower v. Chadwick, 3 Bing. N. C. 34; S. C., 4 Id. 1). This being the state of the common law upon the subject, the legislature in 1855, interposed to regulate the exercise by owners of land
The general term reversed the judgment in this action, on the ground that no license or permission to enter upon the premises of the plaintiff’s testatrix, to protect the wall of her house, was tendered by her to the defendant before the excavation was made, and that, by the true interpretation of the statute of 1855, no liability to protect the wall of an adjoining owner attaches to a person making an excavation on his own premises, until such license is tendered, and that it was not incumbent upon the latter to request permission to enter upon the adjoining land to protect his building. The words “if afforded the necessary license to enter on the adjoining land,” do not, we think, in view of the object of the statute, require this construction. The primary object of the statute was to cast upon the party making an excavation on his land, exceeding ten feet in depth, the risk of injury resulting therefrom, to the wall of an adjoining owner, and the burden of protecting it. The liability imposed is not made to depend upon the degree of care exercised by
We think it would not be a reasonable construction of this clause, that the owner of a building must become an actor in the first instance, and tender a license to the adjoining owner to enter upon his premises, in order to give him the benefit of the statute. He may not know that an excavation is to be made, and if he knows the fact he may not know that it is to be carried beyond the depth mentioned in the statute. If it is not, then both parties stand upon their rights as at common law. This construction also would enable a party to escape the liability imposed by the statute whenever, from the situation of the property or other circumstances, the excavation could be carried on without attracting the attention of the adjacent owner.
The words, “if afforded the necessary license,” &c., do not necessarily imply a license proffered without an application or request of the person receiving it; and the words, “ not otherwise,” merely emphasize the intention of the act, that unless permission to enter upon the adjacent land is given, the obligations imposed by the act do not attach.
The defendant caused the excavation to be made, within the meaning of the act. The fact that he made a contract with Sullivan to do the work did not exempt him as the owner of the premises from the performance
The contract with Sullivan moreover made no reference to the statute of 1855, and the clause which required him “ to make perfect all walls or partitions disturbed or injured” by the alterations, and “to make good all damages caused by the same” refers to injuries and damages to the house of the defendant, resulting from the work done under the contract.
The exception to the ruling of the court, excluding the conversation between the defendant and Thomas Dorrity, was obviated by the fact that the witness was subsequently allowed to state the conversation.
The order of the general term should be reversed, and the judgment on the verdict affirmed, with costs.
Allen, Rapallo and Earl, JJ., concur.
Church, Ch. J., Folgee and Miller, JJ., dissent.
Cases cited
- Sherwood v. Seaman 2 Bosw. 127 p. 294
- McCafferty v. Duyvil & Port Morris Railroad 61 N. Y. 178 p. 294
- Panton v. Holland 17 Johns. 92 p. 294, p. 295
- Farrand v. Marshall 21 Barb. 409 p. 294
- Farrand v. Marshall 19 Barb. 380 p. 294