p. 156Plaintiff demurred, to the answer on the ground, that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a defence.
H. P. Herdman, for the plaintiff,
conceded that the matters pleaded would he good in mitigation of damages, hut contended that they did not amount to a justification. The rule was, the justification must be as broad as the charge. There was nothing alleged against the plaintiff in the answer, which an honorable and high-minded man might not commit. Considered as grounds for mitigating damages, the matter pleaded might as well be shown before a sheriff’s jury.Benjamim, Vaughan Abbott, for the defendant,
argued that if the matter pleaded were admissible in mitigation, the answer must be sustained. The construction now placed upon the section of the Code, which permits defendant in libel to set up both justification and mitigating circumstances, allows him to plead the latter alone. The earlier decisions had been the other way; but the Court of Appeals has overruled them. (11 N. Y. (1 Kern.), 357.) He contended also that the justification set up was sufficient as a bar.I think the answer in the present case is within section 165 of the Code, as interpreted by the case of Bush a. Prosser (1 Kern., 357). There are allegations which, fairly construed, amount to a justification of the libel, and there are circumstances stated avowedly in mitigation of damages.
I think (but I believe the point is new), that it is immaterial that the matters stated in mitigation, are the same as those presented in justification. In other words, these facts are set forth as an absolute defence to any claim, and if insufficient for that purpose, as a partial defence, by operating to reduce plaintiff’s recovery. In my opinion, this is the construction of the pleading, and this is warranted by the Code.
Demurrer to the answer overruled, with costs.