p. 96The answer also set forth fully and in detail the amount and. nature of the infant’s property.
On the petition and answer, Mr. Justice Leonard ordered that the said Joseph W. Savage, the general guardian of the petitioner, as soon as practicable, raise the sum of two thousand dollars upon mortgage of so much and such part of the real estate of the petitioner situate in the city and county of Hew York as should be sufficient security therefor, and that out of the said sum of two thousand dollars, and out of the income of the estate of the petitioner now in his hands or which may hereafter come into his hands, he pay to the petitioner upon her separate receipt the sum of one hundred^and fifty dollars on the first day of each and every month until she should attain the age of twenty-one years.
Tracy, Wait & Olmsted, for the appellant.
I. The Court of Chancery has no inherent original jurisdiction to direct the sale of an infant’s real estate. (Russell a. Bussell, 1 Mall., 527, and cases there cited; Rogers a. Dill, 6 Hill, 415 ; Baker a. Lorillard, 4 N. Y. (4 Comst.), 257; Matter of Turner, 10 Barb., 552 ; Hyatt a. Seeley, 11 N. Y. (1 Kern.), 52; see opinion by Denio, J.)II. Hence, in ordering such sales, the provisions of the Be-vised Statutes must be strictly followed. Those provisions were not complied with in the present instance. There was no guardian appointed, or bond given and filed, or other proceedings had as required by statute. (2 Rev. Stat., 194,195, §§ 170, 175,176; Supreme Court Rules, 67; Matter of Thorne, 1 Edw., 507 .)III. It does not appear that the interests of the infant are to be promoted by the present proposed mortgage. On the contrary, it would be an injudicious disposition of the estate. (2 Rev. Stat., 5 ed., 275, § 105.)George W. Stevens, for the respondent.
All the facts were before the court when the order was made. The application was opposed, and called out every fact and objection that could be made. Hnder these cir
p. 97cumstances a reference was unnecessary to enable the court to ascertain what was proper to be done in the premises.
The statute conferring discretion upon the court in a proper ■ case to direct a disposition of the real estate of an infant for his support, maintenance, and education, is very broad. It is whenever it shall satisfactorily appear that such disposition is necessary and proper. (3 Rev. Stat., 275, § 105, 5 ed.; 2 Ib., 195, §175.)
The previous section authorizes the court to proceed in a summary manner, by reference, to inquire into the merits of the application. The reference is not necessary to give the court jurisdiction. That was acquired by the presentation of the petition showing a case existing wherein an order of reference or other proceeding under the statute might be taken. (Sedgwick on Stat. and Const. L., 370.)
The provision for a reference is not mandatory. It is not “of the essence of the proceeding.” The court may proceed summarily without a reference, if the facts are made to appear so as to show a clear case, where the disposition of the estate of the infant is necessary and proper for any of the purposes indicated by the statute. Such I conceive to be the case here presented.
I advise the affirmance of the order.
Ingraham, P. J., and Peckham, J., concurred. ;