p. 402cript of a justice’s judgment, the execution must be issued by the county clerk. (Code of Pro., § 64, subd. 13.)
The exceptions referring to section 63, had reference to the time of the commencement of the lien and the amount of the judgment to make it a lien on real property. The object of the clause in section 68, relating to judgments docketed upon a transcript from a justice’s court, filed in the office of the clerk of the county of New York, was to place the Court of Common Pleas in the same position,.and to give to such court the same jurisdiction which by sections 63 and 64 had been given to County Courts. There is no County Court in the city and county of New York, but the^old Court of Common Pleas was retained by the Constitution of 1846. The provision relating to the issuing of execution upon judgments docketed in the county clerk’s office by the clerk, is an old provision. It is in the Revised Statutes, and it was never understood that the execution could be issued by an attorney. It was not supposed that the parties would have any attorneys; none were necessary for the purposes of docketing the judgment, and the clerk was required to issue the execution. The declaration that the judgment shall be a judgment of the County Court (section 63,) or be deemed a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of the city and county of New York (section 68), is not new. It is taken from the Revised Statutes.
In my opinion, the executions issued by Clark, attorney, or in his name, were not authorized,' and they were invalid as to Hyslop, and there is no estoppel in the case, upon him or his legal representative and devisees.
Judgment was entered pursuant to the findings. The defendants served exceptions to the findings, and appealed from the judgment.
Anthony R. Pyett, for the appellant.
I. The court erred in permitting the plaintiff to falsify or at least impeach the sheriff’s return.II. The execution was perfectly regular. 1. There was no stay of proceedings under the judgment to prevent its issuing, and the judge on the trial so found, and that finding was correct. (C ode, § 354; Ib., § 355; Ib; § 357; Conway a. Hitchins,
p. 4039 Barb., 378 ; 38 Ib., 238; 14 Abbotts’ Pr., 368; 10 How. Pr., 344 ; 13 Ib., 402; 18 Ib., 261; 12 Abbotts’ Pr., 243; 20 How. Pr., 86 .) 2. The execution was proper and regular in form. It was not necessary that it should be signed or sealed by the county clerk. Section 68 of the Code applies the rules governing the docketing of judgments of justices of the peace docketed with county clerk (Sects. 63 and 64, subd. 13) to those on judgments like the present, “ except that the judgment shall be enforced in the same manner as and be deemed a judgment of the Common Pleas,” and that manner is by an execution • similar to the one issued in the present case (Code, § 289; Ib., § 283), and if enforced in any other manner, it could not be in the same manner. (1 Code R., 107; Ginochio a. Figari, 4 E. D. Smith, 227; 18 How. Pr., 267 ; Jackson a. Smith, 16 Abbotts’ Pr., 201; Carpenter a. Simmons, 28 How. Pr., 12 ; Cowen’s Treatise, ed. of 1856, §1570.) 3. But if the execution was irregular it was voidable and not void, and could not be attacked collaterally so as to defeat the title of the purchaser at the sheriff’s sale under it. And if it had been assailed by a direct motion to set it aside, it was amendable. (Code, §§ 174, 176; 3 Code R., 21; 5 How. Pr., 381 ; 1 Code R., N. S., 47.)III. The finding of fraud is unsustained.IV. It may be claimed (though the judge did not do so) that a court of equity could relieve in this case without the existence of any fraud. But a court has no such power. It is nowhere given in the statute. And nothing is better settled than that in the absence of fraud, a court of equity cannot relieve against the positive provisions or the consequences of a statute, however harsh the statute may be or disastrous the consequences to the party affected. That would be to usurp the powers of the Legislature, and make it subject to any court of equity. In other words, in every statute imposing by words or necessary donsequences any forfeiture whatever by implication, would be added “ subject to the discretion of any court of equity to modify or repeal this statute \” (Willard’s Eq., 40; Ib., 41; Catlin a. Hayden, 1 Verm., 375 , and cases cited; Spear a. Ditty, 9 Ib., 282; Gorman a. Low, 2 Edw., 324 ; Story’s Eq. Juris., §§ 14,15, 19, 20, 21.) ' 'V. But if the court had the power, and it was proper to relieve the plaintiff at all, it could only be done on payment of
p. 404the judgment and expenses of sale, &c., and. the costs of affirmance, and "the costs of this action. No ténder of offer to pay the judgment below even, much less the other items, was either averred in the complaint or proved, and the judgment for this reason should be reversed or modified.But the judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered,, with costs to abide the event.Barrett & Brinsmade, for the respondents.
I am prepared to agree to the affirmance of the j udgmeut, on the ground that the execution issued to the sheriff of Kings county, on which the sheriff’s deed in question was founded, was wholly invalid. The Code (§ 64, subd. 13) provides how executions upon judgments like the one in this case shall be issued. “If the judgment be docketed with the county clerk, the execution shall be. issued by him to the sheriff.” The authority being given to the county clerk exclusively to issue the execution in such a case, it seems to me, it can no more be issued by an attorney than it could had the judgment remained before the.justice. Being issued without authority of law, it was wholly invalid, and conferred no power upon the sheriff to transfer the title of the plaintiff’s testator to any one.
I think the judge at special term was right also in'holding that the defendant’s proceedings upon the judgment were not stayed at the time the executions were issued. But upon the question of fraud (aside from the issuing of the execution by the attorney), I should find it exceedingly difficult to agree with the learned justice at special term.
Sutherland and Clerke, JJ., concurred.