nating on the 31st day of October, 1857: the said defendant having paid the sum of two hundred and seventy-six dollars and sixty-seven cents, on the 29th day of October, 1857, on account of said quarter’s rent.
“ That frequent demands have been made upon the said defendant for' the payment of said balance, but he refused to pay the same.
Capron & Lake, for the defendants.
The complaint is insufficient.—I. It does not aver in terms, nor does it show by statements equivalent to such an averment, a breach of the agreement to pay rent. The complaint should either contain an averment that “neither the assignee nor the lessee paid the rent,” or should show that fact by tantamount averments; such as, “ that the rent is yet in arrear,” or “ is yet unpaid,” or “ is yet due to the plaintiff” (Executors of Dubois v. Van Orden, 6 Johns., 105 ; Van Rensselaer v. Bradley, 3 Den., 135 , and see 143, 144), in order to show a cause of action. It merely avers that the rent sued for “ became due on the 1st day of November,” and that frequent demands have been made on the defendant, but that he refused to pay the same. For all that appears, the rent may have been paid by the lessee. The demand in this case is immaterial, for the rent is payable on a day certain, and no demand is necessary before suit. The material fact to constitute a breach is, that the rent was still unpaid when the suit was brought. This the complaint does not show.II. The complaint shows affirmatively that the plaintiff has no right of recovery against the defendant. The landlord’s remedy for the portion of the rent which accrued before the 28th of August, is against the original lessee alone, who is also liable, at the election of the landlord, for the whole. The assignee is not liable to pay rent which accrued before he became assignee, though it became due after he became assignee. (Glover v. Wilson, 2 Barb., 264 ; 2 East., 575 ; Van Rensselaer v. Bradley, 3 Den., 135 , and see page 144; Childs v. Clark, 3 Barb. Ch. R., 52 ; Zule v. Zule, 24 Wend., 77 ; Taylor on Landl. & T., 185 ; Woodfall on Landl. & T., 192.)Mr. Kissam, for the plaintiff.
I have examined the following cases : Williams v. Bosanquet (1 Brod. & B., 72); Astor v. Miller (2 Paige, 68); Astor v. L’Amoreanx ( 4 Sandf., 524 ); Graves v. Partee ( 11 Barb., 592 ); Burnett v. Lynch (5 Barnw. & C., 589); Van Rensselaer v. Bonesteel ( 24 Barb., 365 ); Dolph v. White (2 Kern., 296).
I think this proposition is undoubted law, that a covenant to pay rent runs with the land, and binds the assignee of the lease; and that when a covenant to pay rent becomes broken, after an acceptance of an assignment and during actual possession, the assignee is liable precisely as the lessee would have been.
Whatever, then, may be the case as to a liability for covenants broken before possession, or after possession is relinquished, the rule above stated clearly decides the present question. The defendant was in the occupation under his assignment when the quarter’s rent fell due and the breach of the covenant occurred.
Judgment for the plaintiff, on the demurrer, with costs.