p. 267the suspension of payment was the act of plaintiff to defraud defendant of his interest in the firm assets; that being, as well as the plaintiff, a grandson of the original A. Bininger, he was as much a Bininger as plaintiff; that he was at liberty to write his name A. Bininger, and ended with a denial of the fraud and collusion charged in the complaint.
Tompkins Westervelt, for the motion.
I. The good will of a commercial business or trade constitutes a part of the firm assets, which, upon dissolution, must be sold, being by nature' indivisible (Colly, on Part., §§ 162, note 3 ; 322, note 4; Story on Part., § 99 ; Dougherty v. Van Hostrand, 1 Hoffm. Ch., 68; Williams v. Wilson, 4 Sandf. Ch., 379 ; Fenn v. Bolles, 7 Abb. Pr., 202 ; Featherstonhaugh v. Fenwick, 17 Ves., 298; Gow on Part., 255).II. Upon the dissolution of a firm, each partner has a right in equity to have the partnership property preserved and applied to the firm debts (Smith v. Haviland, cited in Deveau v. Fowler, 2 Paige, 401; Story on Part., § 326). Equity will enjoin a partner from injuring or impairing the partnership property (Story on Part., § 329; 4 Sandf. Ch., 380 , 381; Story Eq. Jur., §§ 669, 672).III. Equity will enjoin these defendants from using plaintiff’s name, or the name of plaintiff’s firm, or any part of either (Story' s Eq., Jur., § 951; Story on Part., §§ 211, 212 ; Howard v. Henriques, 3 Sandf. Ch., 725 ; Woodward v. Lasar, 21 Cal., 448 ; Taylor v. Carpenter, 11 Paige, 292 ; Bell v. Locke, 8 Paige, 75 ; Clarke v. Clarke, 25 Barb., 76 ; Knott v. Morgan, 2 Keen, 213; Wellington V. Fox, 3 Mylne & C., 338; Croft v. Day, 7 Beav., 84; Edleston v. Vick, 23 Eng. Law & Eq., 51).IV. The receiver of the superior court held the firm property for the benefit of Bininger to the extent of his
p. 268interest, pending the action to wind np the partnership. The assignee in bankruptcy holds any surplus in trust' for Bininger. In the preservation of that surplus Bininger has a personal interest for which he may, in equity, proceed in his own name, notwithstanding the assignment (Sedgwick v. Cleveland, 7 Paige, 390 ; Deveau v. Fowler, 2 Id., 400).M. Compton, opposed.
I. Plaintiff is restrained from interfering with the assets of the firm of A. Bininger & Co., by the injunction of the superior court.II. The title to the property is vested in the assignee in bankruptcy (Bankrupt Act, § 14).III. The title to the property is in the receiver of the superior court.IV. The name .of “A. Bininger & Co.” is not a trademark, and plaintiff has no exclusive right to it.V. The name used by defendants was not the name of the firm of A. Bininger & Co.VI. The propriety of the action in the superior court is res judicata.VII. The equities of the bill are all denied, and in such case there must be strong supporting evidence to sustain the injunction (Hoffman v. Livingston, 1 Johns. Ch., 211 ; Roberts v. Anderson, 2 Id., 202; Skinner v. White, 17 Johns., 357 ).VIII. The bill itself shows no superior equity.IX. The damage is only apprehended. In such case, the case must be strong and free from doubt.X. One partner cannot sue his copartner respecting the copartnership, except on an accounting.XI. Where the injury complained of results from persons using their proper names, it is no ground for an injunction. The restraint is as great as the injury.The good will of a business firm is an
p. 269important part of its property, and will be protected by a court of equity whenever a proper case arises. In this case it is alleged and not denied that it constituted the most valuable part of the firm assets. Any appropriation of it by one partner to the exclusion of the other, unless acquired upon a fair sale, is manifestly a wrong not to be tolerated.
The facts shown clearly sustain the plaintiff’s allegations that it has been so appropriated. The defendant closely imitates the name of the late firm, and not satisfied with that, describes himself as “Successor to A. Bininger & Co.”
He also placed signs in close proximity to the firm’s late place of business, with the plain intent of diverting any trade that followed the late firm to the place now occupied by him.
If this is allowed, the plaintiff’s interest in the good will of A. Bininger & Co.'will be destroyed.
The fact that defendant’s name is “A. Bininger Clark,” does not obscure the defendant’s wrongful design, nor in any manner change the case.
After having for forty years written his name “Abm. B. Clark,” his now writing “A. Bininger Clark,” cannot be considered an accident. If it is one, he should be admonished not to continue it in a manner so likely to mislead the public.
Our statutes provide for changing names, and it has. been held that at common law a person may change his name at will. But it by no means follows that after making such change a person may so use his new name as to attract business from another person whose name he has adopted.
The receivership does not affect the right of the plaintiff to bring this suit, nor does the assignment in bankruptcy. The plaintiff has an interest in protecting the property of the late firm, so that his debts may be
p. 270discharged, and possibly a surplus realized for his own use. He is therefore a propér person to bring this suit. The injunction must be continued.