p. 472defendant took the scow there, and in a storm she was, blown ashore and injured.'
The contract was made by the agent of the plaintiff with the agent of the defendant over the telephone. The. former testifies that he told the latter (Driscoll) that “ we objected" to sending it down to Greenville ”, because she was new, and because the anchorage was about three-quarters of a mile from the fill, and if a n-orth- ' easter came- up the scows at the anchorage were endangered. He then says: “ My recollection is that Mr. Driscoll said he wouldn’t send her down to Greenville” ; and then follows this question and answer as the last on the subject: i6Q. .Did you tell him you wouldn’t let him go to-Greenville? A; We objected to its going to Greenville,” He entered the terms of the hiring in. the plaintiff’s scow book, but omitted any, restriction as to where the scow might go. • The agent for the defendant (Driscoll) testifies positively that there was no restriction as to the movements of the scow in ; the leasing. Before, during the time of and after, the use of the scow by the defendant other scows of the defendant went continuously to'-the Greenville fill.. There was no other evidence on the subject. i-
Henry Wetherhorn, for the appellant.
Mark Ash [ William Ash and David W Travis with him on the brief], for the respondent.
.The contract that the scow should not be taken to Greenville was not proven. The evidence for the plaintiff left it a matter of uncer1 taint-y at best. And if such a contract could be eked out therefrom, to find it woul.d be against the weight of evidence.
Assuming that the contract was proved, it was error to exclude evidence to show that the damages were caused or suffered in whole or in part by the neglect of the plaintiff’s captain who was aboard and in charge, of her to take proper care of her in the storm. Although the contract were broken by the defendant, it would be for the captain, to dp what he reasonably-could in the care of the scow to prevent her from going ashore. That he did not do so was not a defense to be pleaded; on the contrary, the question was what
p. 473damage the breach of the defendant caused, and that would be in issue even on an assessment on failure to answer. The amount of damage-is always in issue, even without a denial thereof
(Milton v.
Hudson River Steamboat Co., 37 N. Y. 210 ).
The judgment should be reversed.
Hirsohberg, P. J., Rich and.Miller, JJ., concurred; Hooker, J., dissented. ' -
Judgment and order reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide the event.