p. 7plaintiffs well knew, he" guaranteed and promised to be answerable for the payment of the price of materials to be sold to the amount of $7,330 and no more; that the materials were to be delivered at certain buildings of which the testator had died seized and possessed, and which his said executors held in trust. He denies that he ever made, either as executor as aforesaid or individually, any guarantee except for the said sum, which has been fully paid.
- At the close of plaintiffs’ case defendant moved for dismissal on on the grounds, first, that the papers on their face are an obligation of the estate and not the defendant personally, and, second, that the guarantee is to pay the amounts due under a contract between Winberg and these plaintiffs, and the only proof of any contract is that for the $7,330, and the receipts are in full therefor. The motion was denied under exception, but after the defendant’s opening the court said that if the second guarantee, made in February, 1906, was a continuation of the first guarantee, and if the goods were not delivered to Mr. Winberg —- if he was not in charge of the work — that the defendant could not be bound. The court further said that the second guarantee sufficiently referred to the first guarantee, and undoubtedly referred to the $7,330, which was the subject of the contract with Winberg. And after further discussion the court said: “ I am inclined to hold that under this second guarantee * * * there is no personal liability of this defendant,” wherefore it granted the motion to dismiss, under exception.
J. Stewart Ross [Frank Obernier with him on the brief], for the appellants.
Rufus O. Catlin [ James C. Cropsey with him on the brief], for the respondent.
We think that the “second guarantee” may be regarded as an order upon the plaintiffs to furnish materials of the kind required by the contract of Winberg, but to be delivered in the name, i. e., to the estate of Charles W. Smith. Payment is promised, not only for the materials furnished, but for those to be furnished, and payment is guaranteed as before, i. e., as the work progresses. It is ‘true that the plaintiffs plead on a guarantee, but we may gather
p. 8from the complaint that the materials were to be' delivered at certain specified buildings (which it appears were the property of the estate), and, as we have said, the “ second guarantee ” indicates, that there was a direct order for delivery to the estate. We think, then, that the circumstances .admit a consideration that this Undertaking was original in its, character. (See
Ward v. Hasbrouck, 169 N. Y. 407 .) The action was properly brought against the defendant per- sonally.
(New v. Nicoll, 12 Hun, 431 ; affd.,
73 N. Y. 127 , and authorities cited.)
The judgment is reversed and a new trial is granted, costs .to abide the event.
Woodward, Thomas and Carr, JJ., concurred; Hirschberg, P. J., dissented.
Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide the event.