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Quatfasel v. New York & Queens County Railway Co.

151 A.D. 61 Court Second Department, Decision date 1912-05-24 English

Delivered by Woodward, J.:

Contents

Majority

p. 61
Frederick Quatfasel, an Infant, by Adolph Quatfasel, His Guardian ad Litem, Appellant, v. New York and Queens County Railway Company, Respondent.
Second Department,
May 24, 1912.

Headnote

Railroad — negligence — injury to child while stringing cables — proof raising question of negligence — identity of defendant.
A railroad company may be found negligent where while engaged in stringing cables upon poles along a thoroughfare it allowed the cable to sag to within eighteen inches of the sidewalk between poles, and then suddenly drew the cable tight with a team of horses so as to catch and raise in the air a child standing with his back to the cable, from which he subsequently fell to the ground.
Evidence that the wagon bringing the poles and supplies for the work was marked with the initials or name of the defendant, together with other surrounding circumstances, is sufficient to take to the jury the question as to whether the work was being done by the defendant.
Upon a nonsuit the plaintiff is entitled to all legitimate inferences from the evidence.
Appeal by the plaintiff, Frederick Quatfasel, an infant, etc., from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Queens on the 11th day of October, 1911, upon the dismissal of the complaint by direction of the court at the close of plaintiff’s case on a trial at the Queens County Trial Term.
p. 62
George F. Hickey [M. P. O’Connor with him on the brief], for the appellant.
G. B. Hanavan [Bayard H Ames, John Montgomery and James L. Quackenbush with him on the brief], for the respondent.

The plaintiff, an infant of nearly five years. of age at the time of the accident, was playing upon the sidewalk opposite his father’s store in Pierce avenue, Long Island City, on the ' 29th day of September, 1909. A party of men, alleged to be in the employ of the defendant, were engaged in placing wire cables upon certain poles along that thoroughfare. In doing this the cables would be lifted up to the supporting arms upon the poles, the loops falling nearly to the sidewalk. These loops were taken up and the cables made taut by means of a team of horses hitched to the end of the cable some distance away. The plaintiff was standing with his back to one of these sagging cables, which was about eighteen inches above the sidewalk, when the team was suddenly started and the child was caught under the arms and carried suddenly up a distance of about two stories, and when the cable became straight it operated like a bowstring and threw him off, resulting in serious injuries. The cash is so identical in its principles with Devine v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co. ( 1 App. Div. 237 ) that we feel called upon to reverse the judgment now before us’ on the authority of that case.

It is attempted to show here that there was no evidence to establish that the defendant was doing the work. It may be admitted that the evidence was not entirely satisfactory,' but we are of the opinion that in the state of the pleadings, with the defendant’s admissions, evidence that a wagon bringing tools and supplies to this work was marked with the initials or with the name of the defendant, and the other facts and circumstances surrounding the occurrence, was some evidence in support of the cause of action;' was evidence which demanded the submission of the question to the jury, even though the court might owe the duty of setting aside a verdict based upon such evidence. This is a nonsuit and the plaintiff

p. 63
is entitled to all the legitimate inferences from the evidence, and we are persuaded that a prima facie case was presented by the evidence and one which justified a submission to the jury unless, upon the' presentation of defendant’s case, there was some conclusive fact to overcome the testimony tending to connect the defendant with the accident.

The judgment appealed from should be reversed and a new trial granted, costs to abide the event.

Jenks, P. J., Hirschberg, Burr and Rich, JJ., concurred.

Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide the event.

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