p. 153The People of the State of New York ex rel. Brooklyn, Queens County and Suburban Railroad Company, Respondent, v. Alfred E. Steers, President of the Borough of Brooklyn, Appellant.Headnote
Railroad — Railroad Law, section 12—failure to construct road and expend ten per cent of capital within five years — certificate of extension of street railroad, naming separate routes.The purpose of the provision of section 13 of the Railroad Law that “if any domestic railroad corporation shall not, within five years after its certificate of incorporation is filed, begin the construction of its road and expend thereon ten per centum of the amount of its capital, * * * its corporate existence and powers shall cease,” is to prevent a railroad company from obtaining a franchise for the operation of a railroad through a large number of designated streets and then indefinitely postponing actual construction through any portion thereof.
Hence, where a street railroad company filed a certificate of extension, naming eight separate and distinct routes, each route must be deemed a separate extension, and although the company has, within the prescribed period, expended upon two of the routes a sum equal to ten per cent of the capital necessary to construct a road upon all of the eight routes named in the certificate, and the total mileage of track thus laid exceeds ten per cent of the entire trackage upon all of the additional routes, the company, not having commenced work on the other separate routes, has forfeited its right to build a road thereon, and a municipal permit for that purpose was properly denied.
Appeal by the defendant, Alfred E. Steers, president, etc., from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Kings County Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 5tb. day of April, 1913, granting relator’s motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus.
William P. Burr [William J. Clarke and Archibald R. Watson with him on the brief], for the appellant.
Charles L. Woody [George D. Yeomans with him on the brief], for the respondent.
Relator is a domestic street railroad corporation, and is the successor in interest of the Broadway Railroad Company,
p. 156self-executing.
(Matter of Brooklyn, Queens County & Suburban R. R. Co., 185 N. Y. 183 .) Upon the Balph avenue route and the Utica avenue route within the prescribed period relator has expended a sum equal to ten per cent of the capital necessary to construct a railroad upon all of the eight routes named in the certificate, and the total mileage of track thus laid exceeds ten per cent of the entire trackage upon all of said additional routes. The learned court at Special Term fairly stated the controversy in these words :
“ The relator claims that all eight routes named in the certificate of extension filed December 31, 1892, constitute one extension. The city authorities on the other hand contend that the one certificate of extension enumerating eight routes contains in law and fact eight separate extensions.” ( 80 Misc. Rep. 324 .) We think that the latter construction is correct. An extension involves the idea of something pre-existing, with which it is connected, and which is thereby enlarged. In
Bohmer v.
Haffen ( 35 App. Div. 381 , 388; affd.,
161 N. Y. 390 ) Presiding Justice Van Brunt said:
“ In considering the provisions of chapter 616 of the Laws of 1892, in relation to extensions by street surface railroad corporations, it would seem that the word
‘ extend ’ was not intended to be used in its restricted sense of prolongation in a given direction, but rather that it was intended to enable the railroad company to acquire a right of construction, maintenance and operation of additional
routes which might be operated in connection with its existing lines. ” But each extension which is unrelated to any other extension except through the thing which they enlarge would naturally be spoken of as a separate extension just as the certificate in question described them as separate and additional routes. The branch must of necessity be joined to the vine and be a part thereof, but as between themselves each branch has a separate and distinct entity. In
Matter of Brooklyn, Queens County & Suburban R. R. Co. (supra) the court said (p. 183):
“ The certificate of extension which a corporation files is in effect, clearly and simply, an amendment of its original articles of incorporation.' Those • original articles prescribe the line and extent of its proposed route. The certificate of extension prescribes the line and route of an additional road and to that extent amends the orig
p. 157inal articles of incorporation. For the purposes of this provision, we think it may naturally and easily he treated as an amendment to the articles of incorporation made to include the proposed extension, and the date of filing of which will fix the periods within which a corporation must act as to said extension.” This language must of course be construed in the light of the facts then under consideration. In that case but a single extension, that along Saratoga avenue, was involved, and the court had before it the question whether the provisions of this statute were applicable to street surface railroads, were self-executing or otherwise, and the meaning of the words “ ten per centum ” of the amount of its capital. The learned court at Special Term, however, making use of this language as a basis for its argument, says: “It can hardly be contended that if all the streets named in the various routes in the certificate of extension of December 31, 1892, had originally been named in the articles of incorporation of the company, and over ten per centum of the total cost of the first projected railroad had been made in actual construction, there could have been a forfeiture.” If the argument proves anything, it proves too much. If the original articles of incorporation are to be deemed amended in this broad sense, and were these new roads automatically to become part of the original system, then if the company had expended upon its original route ten per cent of the amount necessary to construct both its original and extended road, no actual construction would ever become necessary on the parts added by extension to prevent forfeiture for violation of the statutory requirement above referred to. Again, although more than ten per cent had been expended upon the construction of the original route, if when the certificate of extension was filed less than ten per cent of the cost of the original route plus the extension had been expended, instantly forfeiture would follow. The question actually decided in Matter of Brooklyn, Queens County & Suburban R. R. Co. (supra), that the ten per cent provision referred to the cost of the extension only, clearly indicates that the language of the opinion cannot be enlarged to the extent claimed. We think that the manifest purpose of the statutory requirement that within five
p. 159tificates were to .be read together as constituting a single extension. The fact that eight unrelated routes,- separately described, were included in a single instrument, cannot make any difference as to the construction or meaning thereof.
The order should be reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and the motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus should be denied, with fifty dollars costs.
Jenks, P. J., Thomas, Carr and Putnam, JJ., concurred.
Order reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and motion for peremptory writ of mandamus denied, with fifty dollars costs. -