Devoy v. New York Cut Flower Co. — 26 A.D. 539

Majority

p. 539

Thomas Devoy and Peter T. Devoy, Appellants, v. New York Cut Flower Company, Respondent.

Headnote

Breach of contract—failure to pay as agreed—excuse must he shown therefor.

Where a dealer in flowers has not, during a period of five weeks, paid, in accordance with the terms of his contract, for-flowers delivered to him, in any one of such weeks, but has in each case been several days behindhand in his payments,

p. 540

and when payment has been demanded has refused to make it, it is improper, in an action brought against such dealer by the vendor of the flowers,.-to recover damages as for a breach of the contract by the dealer, in the absence of some good excuse furnished by him for such defaults on his part, to dismiss the complaint.'

It seems, that, if excuse be given, a question of fact is presented.

Appeal by the plaintiffs, Thomas Devoy and another, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Dutchess on the 4th day of May, 1897, upon an order made at the Dutchess Trial Term dismissing the complaint.

The action was brought to recover damages for jhe breach by the defendant of a contract whereby the plaintiffs agreed tó consign to the defendant for sale the products of their greenhouses for the term of one year, and also to recover a sum deposited with the defendant as security for the plaintiffs’ performance of the contract.

Frank B. Lown, for the appellants.

Alfred A. Gardner [William J. Kelly with him on the brief], for the respondent.

I think the evidence on the part of the plaintiffs was sufficient, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, to require the submission'of the case to the jury. The contract obligated the" . defendant to pay to the plaintiffs, at the end of each week, the amount due for the flowers consigned by them during the week previous. The defendant did not comply with this provision in the ■case of any week’s sale during the period of ffve weeks for which the contract was performed, but was always several days behindhand in its payments. In Wharton & Co. v. Winch ( 140 N. Y. 287 ) it is said: “ It is undoubtedly true that the defendant’s failure to pay the installment was such a breach of the contract as absolved the plaintiff from all obligation to further perform, on his part, while the default continued. Nor was he bound to grant the defendant any indulgence, and wait for any period of time, in order to enable him to make good his broken promise. In that sense punctual payment was a condition precedent. The obligation of the. plaintiff to ' proceed under the contract depended upon it. If it was not ful

p. 541

filled, one of two courses was open to the plaintiff. He might at once rescind the contract and refuse to go on.” (See, also, Moore v. Taylor, 42 Hun, 45 .) We do not mean to say that every default; or delay in payment, resulting from inadvertence, inability to makeup accounts or some cause of that character, would relieve the plaintiffs from the obligation of their contract. “ The right of a. party to enforce a contract will not be forfeited or lost by reason of technical, inadvertent or unimportant omissions or defects. * * * There must be no willful or' intentional departure, and the defects, of performance must not pervade the whole, or be so essential as substantially to defeat the object which the parties intended to accomplish. Whether, in any case,.such defects or omissions are substantial, or merely unimportant mistakes that have been or may be corrected, is generally a question of fact.” (Miller v. Benjamin, 60 N. Y. St. Repr. 295 .)

On the occasion when the plaintiffs terminated the contract, they demanded the payment then due them. This was refused. It was incumbent on the defendant to show an excuse for such refusal, and the sufficiency of the excuse was for the jury.

I am also of opinion that the evidence as to the grade and price allowed for the plaintiffs’ flowers was sufficient, in the absence of explanation, to warrant the inference that the plaintiffs had not been fairly treated, or the contract carried out by the defendant. I can see that an explanation might be made by the defendant so clear as to justify the court in disposing of this issue, but, in the absence of explanation, the question was for the jury.

The judgment should be reversed and a. new trial granted, costs to abide the event.

All concurred.

Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide the event.

Cases cited

William Wharton, Jr., & Co. v. Winch 140 N. Y. 287 N.Y. 1893-12-05 p. 540