Majority
OPINION OF THE COURT
The Salvation Army, a religious and charitable organization organized in New York State pursuant to chapter 468 of the Laws of 1899 as amended by chapter 247 of the Laws of 1957, brought this proceeding under article 7 of the Real Property Tax Law for review of the assessment of certain real property owned by it in the Town of Ellicott.[1] The premises, used as a Salvation Army “thrift store”, are open to the general public during normal business hours. A variety of donated items that have been “repaired, cleaned and put into workable condition” are sold at the store for a nominal price and the “net proceeds” are used by the Army
1 The deed conveying the premises to the Salvation Army and its tax exemption application list a New York City address.
Under that section, real property owned by a corporation organized and conducted exclusively for religious or charitable purposes is entitled to a tax exemption if the property is used exclusively for carrying out the exempt purposes of its owner provided that no officer or member of the owning corporation receives any pecuniary profit from the property’s use. Here, there is no dispute that the Salvation Army, which owns the property, is organized and conducted exclusively for purposes which entitle it to a tax exemption and that no officer or member of the Army derives any pecuniary profit from the operation of the thrift store. The narrow issue is whether the property sought to be taxed is used exclusively in furtherance of the concededly exempt purposes for which the Army is organized. The term “exclusive” as it is used in this context has been interpreted to mean “principal” or “primary” (Matter of Symphony Space v Tishelman, 60 NY2d 33 , 38). If the ostensible purposes for which the property is used, however, “are a guise or pretense for profit making” the property is not tax exempt (Matter of Syracuse Univ. v City of Syracuse, 92 AD2d 46 , 51, mot for lv to app dsmd 59 NY2d 668 ). Thus, a tax exemption is warranted here if the use of property as a thrift store carries out the Army’s primary exempt purposes and is not a guise for profit making.
It has been held that the special act incorporating the Salvation Army (L 1899, ch 468) was intended, among other things, to authorize it to engage in the sale of “books, dry goods and uniforms”, and to exempt the Army from all taxation therewith (People ex rel. Salvation Army v Feitner, 33 Misc 712 , 713, affd 68 App Div 639 ; see, also, 4 Opns of Counsel of St Bd of Equal & Assess No. 106, p 195). In 1980, it was also held that premises on which a Salvation Army thrift shop is located in Port Chester, New York, are exempt from real property taxation since the store is operated in furtherance of the Army’s primary exempt purposes and provides “rehabilitation opportunities” and “work therapy” for “unfortunate homeless men” who assist
2 Formerly section 420 (renum by L 1981, ch 919).
Special Term, acting upon the pleadings alone, viewed itself as “constrained” by the Port Chester decision and directed respondent town to grant a real property tax exemption to the property in question. We agree with this result, and for the reasons which follow affirm the order granting the exemption.
The town argues that for several reasons Special Term erred as a matter of law in holding that the property is used for one of the exempt purposes for which the Salvation Army was established. Its principal contention is that the Salvation Army thrift store here, like the thrift store in Matter of Stuyvesant Sq. Thrift Shop v Tax Comm. ( 54 NY2d 735 ), is operated as a commercial retail sales outlet open to the public solely to generate funding. According to the town, the thrift store operation does not fall within the permitted activities in which the Army is authorized to engage and is not an activity conducted exclusively to carry out the Army’s religious and charitable purposes. Thus, the town argues that the premises on which the store is located are not tax exempt. Furthermore, the town while conceding that the essential facts[3] are the same here as in Port Chester ( 110 Misc 2d 1036 , supra), argues that, in light of Stuyvesant (supra), Port Chester was wrongly decided.
We view the town’s concession that the facts here are substantially the same as in Port Chester (supra) as critical because in Port Chester the importance of the thrift store as a rehabilitative tool utilized by the Army was established at a trial. Thus, the facts developed there must be closely examined in the context of this case.
It is apparent after examining Port Chester (supra) that the Army’s thrift store operation generates funds which
3 According to the town, the only difference between this case and Port Chester ( 110 Misc 2d 1036 ) is that the net proceeds of the thrift store here are used to support an out-of-State Salvation Army center.
We have considered the other arguments by the town on this appeal and find them to be without merit.
Accordingly, the judgment of Special Term granting the tax exemption should be affirmed.
Hancock, Jr., J. P., Denman, Boomer and O’Donnell, JJ., concur.
Judgment unanimously affirmed, with costs.
4 In addition, we note that unlike Stuyvesant ( 54 NY2d 735 ), where the thrift store was owned by a separate and independent membership corporation with no independent corporate exempt purpose, the thrift store here is owned by a corporation whose religious and charitable purposes are unquestioned.
Cases cited
- Symphony Space, Inc. v. Tishelman 60 NY2d 33 at 38 p. 362
- Syracuse University v. City of Syracuse 92 AD2d 46 at 51 p. 362, p. 365
- People ex rel. Salvation Army v. Feitner 33 Misc 712 at 713 p. 362
- Salvation Army v. Commission of Assessment & Taxation of Port Chester 110 Misc 2d 1036 at 1040-1041 p. 363
- Stuyvesant Square Thrift Shop, Inc. v. Tax Commission 54 NY2d 735 p. 363, p. 365
- St. Joseph's Health Center Properties, Inc. v. Srogi 51 NY2d 127 at 131 p. 365
- Genesee Hospital v. Wagner 47 AD2d 37 p. 365
- Genesee Hospital v. Wagner 39 NY2d 863 p. 365
- People ex rel. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society, Inc. v. Haring 8 NY2d 350 p. 365
- Nassau County Council Boy Scouts v. Board of Assessors 84 AD2d 862 p. 365