Majority
The defendant was convicted of selling over 16 ounces of heroin to an undercover officer on December 2, 1983, and
On appeal the defendant argues that the trial court violated his due process rights as well as the mandatory requirements of CPL 310.30 when, upon receipt of the deliberating jury’s note asking for a definition of "entrapment”, the court failed to summon the jury to the courtroom for further instructions. It was unclear whether or not the defendant was present in the courtroom when the jury’s inquiry was received. The defendant further submits that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s improper "vouching” for his main witness during summation.
The defendant’s allegations are without merit. By its plain language CPL 310.30 requires that a jury’s request for further instruction, be it on the law, the evidence or "other matter”, must be "pertinent to the jury’s consideration of the case” (emphasis supplied) before it triggers a court’s obligation to reassemble the jury in the courtroom and issue further instructions in the defendant’s presence. The trial court in the instant case quite properly sent a note to the deliberating jury advising it that "entrapment” was not "pertinent” to its "consideration of the case”, since this defense had never been raised or even alluded to in any of the testimony. "Entrapment” was, in fact, inimical to the defense counsel’s trial strategy, which sought to establish that the defendant was entirely innocent of all charges of drug possession and sale, and it is clear from the record that retained counsel afforded the defendant meaningful representation (see, People v Satterfield, 66 NY2d 796 , 799-800). As part of this strategy, the defense counsel explicitly waived the reassembling of the jury upon receipt of its inquiry regarding entrapment, and urged the court simply to respond in writing that entrapment was not an issue. It is not clear from the record whether or not the defendant was absent from the courtroom during these proceedings, nor has the defendant come forward with any "substantial evidence” to rebut "the presumption of regularity” that official proceedings enjoy (People v Richetti, 302 NY 290 , 298; see, People ex rel. Bartlam v Murphy, 13 NY2d 1068 , 1069, application to amend remittitur denied 14 NY2d 548 ). However, even assuming that the defendant was absent, it cannot be said that he missed a material part of his trial, since the court gave the jury no "instruction” except that it declined to instruct on a defense not "pertinent” to the jury’s consideration of the case (see, People v Mehmedi, 69 NY2d 759 , rearg denied 69 NY2d 985 ).
Cases cited
- People v. Satterfield 66 NY2d 796 at 799-800 p. 548
- People v. Richetti 302 NY 290 at 298 p. 548
- People ex rel. Bartlam v. Murphy 13 NY2d 1068 at 1069 p. 548
- Steingold v. Capital Airlines, Inc. 14 NY2d 548 p. 548
- People v. Mehmedi 69 NY2d 759 p. 548
- People v. Vataj 69 NY2d 985 p. 548
- People v. Medina 53 NY2d 951 p. 549
- People v. Ashwal 39 NY2d 105 at 109 p. 549
- Williams v. Brooklyn Elevated Railroad 126 NY 96 at 103 p. 549
- People v. Anthony 24 NY2d 696 at 703-704 p. 549
- Michigan Mutual Liability Co. v. State 25 NY2d 647 p. 549
- People v. Roopchand 107 AD2d 35 p. 549