Majority
— Order, Supreme Court, New York County (William P. McCooe, J.), entered February 29, 1988, which granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the actions pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4) on the ground of prior actions pending, and denied, as moot, defendants’ motion to consolidate and plaintiffs’ cross motion for partial summary judgment, unanimously reversed to the extent appealed from as limited by appellants’ brief, on the law, defendants’ motion to dismiss denied, the complaints reinstated, the actions consolidated, and the matter remanded to Supreme Court for determination of plaintiffs’ cross motion for partial summary judgment, with costs.
Although the parties involved and the relief sought in the present foreclosure actions are virtually identical to those involved in the five foreclosure actions commenced in 1984 and subsequently stayed in 1985, the present actions differ from the 1984 actions in that the facts underlying the actions are different. In 1984, plaintiffs sought foreclosure because of defendants’ failure to make interest payments totaling approximately $267,000 which were due on July 1, 1984, while the present actions seek foreclosure due to defendants’ default in the payment of principal amounts due January 1, 1987. Thus, since it appears settled that a mortgagee may maintain sepa
Cases cited
- Golden v. Ramapo Improvement Corp. 78 AD2d 648 at 650-651 p. 369
- Kent Development Co. v. Liccione 37 NY2d 899 at 901 p. 369
- Bofinger v. Bofinger 107 Misc 2d 573 at 574-575 p. 369