Majority
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (White, J.), entered November 14, 1990 in Montgomery County, which granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Plaintiff commenced this action to recover for injuries sustained by plaintiff’s infant daughter when she was bitten by defendants’ dog. The complaint alleges, inter alia, that the dog was dangerous and that defendants should have known of its vicious propensities. Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Supreme Court granted the motion and plaintiff now appeals.
We affirm. Defendants supported their motion with deposition testimony that, to the best of their knowledge, the dog had never previously bitten anyone or otherwise evidenced vicious propensities. Inasmuch as proof of the animal’s ferocious nature and a defendant’s knowledge thereof is essential to a cause of action for injuries sustained in an attack by a dog (see, Muller v McKesson, 73 NY 195 , 199; Lynch v Nacewicz, 126 AD2d 708 ; 5A Warren, Negligence in the New York Courts, Animals, §§ 4.02-4.04, at 133-135 [3d ed]), this showing established, prima facie, defendants’ entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see, Winegrad v New York Univ. Med.
Weiss, J. P., Yesawich Jr., Levine and Harvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.
Cases cited
- Muller v. McKesson 73 NY 195 at 199 p. 875
- Lynch v. Nacewicz 126 AD2d 708 p. 875
- Winegrad v. New York University Medical Center 64 NY2d 851 at 853 p. 876
- Zuckerman v. City of New York 49 NY2d 557 at 562 p. 876
- Panzer v. Harding 118 AD2d 842 at 843 p. 876