dent’s clothing or effects, including her hand bag,. which she was permitted to keep. Again, however, the proof did not necessarily require a finding that no search was made. We find that there was negligence, however, in otherwise failing to exercise reasonable care in supervision. Complaining of a broken spring in her bed and of being disturbed by the snoring of another patient, decedent, an hour or more after retiring in the dormitory room to which she had been assigned, where there were approximately 15 other patients, in an “ area well illuminated ”, sought and obtained permission from the ward attendant to take her mattress, and the effects which she kept at the foot of her bed, to a side room, ostensibly to sleep there, upon the mattress which she placed upon the floor. She was further permitted, despite complete knowledge and recorded warnings respecting her suicidal tendencies, to close the door, so that she had to be observed, as the sole attendant passed by during the night, through a small aperture — “a little square opening” — high in the door (as disclosed by a significant exhibit), and under a “dim” light, the attendant stating that she “wouldn’t have noticed” the plastic bag from the door; and it being evident that, like decedent’s other preparations for suicide in the privacy she had thus contrived, the bag indeed had not been noticed for a long period after it was in place, since the condition of decedent’s body indicated that she had been dead for a considerable time when, in the morning, an attendant for the first time actually entered the room, and then only for the -purpose of awakening her for the start of the hospital day. That actionable negligence was demonstrated seems clear, and this conclusion is strengthened by the testimony, somewhat qualified though it may be, of a hospital physician that “ ordinarily ” a patient of suicidal tendencies would not be placed in a private room. That an attempt at suicide would be the result, as it was the purpose, of the relative seclusion and greater security from observation and interruption thus obtained, was reasonably to be foreseen. (See, e.g.,
Szostah v.
State of New York, 20 A D 2d 828 ;
Wilson v.
State of New York,
14 A D 2d 976 , mot. for iv. to opp. den. 11 N Y 2d 643 .) There was some prospect that, had she lived, decedent would have recovered in some few. years and have again been able to contribute to the support of her mother. The special damages consisted of funeral expenses of $1,645. The claimant administrator is entitled to recover damages of $9,145. Judgment reversed, on the law and the facts, with costs to appellant, and claimant awarded judgment for $9,145, with appropriate interest, and costs. Herlihy, Reynolds, Aulisi and Hamm, JJ., concur.