Majority
Appeal from that part of an order of the Supreme Court (Connor, J.), entered November 6, 1995 in Columbia County, which denied a cross motion by defendant Ace Suzuki Sales and Service, Inc. for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Plaintiffs, Vincent Jornov and his wife, commenced this personal injury action following Jornov’s slip and fall on Feb
Following the commencement of this action and joinder of issue, plaintiffs moved for an order requiring the examination before trial of defendants’ representatives. Ace Suzuki cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Supreme Court, inter alia, denied Ace Suzuki’s cross motion and this appeal followed.
In our view, Supreme Court erred in denying Ace Suzuki’s cross motion for summary judgment. Defendants maintain that Ace Suzuki cannot be held liable for Jornov’s injuries as a matter of law because its duty to keep the parking lot clear of ice was suspended until a reasonable time after the cessation of the " 'storm in progress’ ” (Zima v North Colonie Cent. School Dist., 225 AD2d 993 , 994). Plaintiffs argue, however, that it was not snow or ice from the ongoing storm that caused Jornov to slip, but a patch or sheet of ice negligently left over from a snowstorm which preceded the subject accident (see, e.g., Boyko v Limowski, 223 AD2d 962 , 963). As support for this argument, plaintiffs submit only Jornov’s affidavit, wherein he states that: "It is my recollection that in the week prior to my accident, it had been unusually warm for a day or two. This undoubtedly allowed the snowbank to melt and water to accumulate on the parking lot prior to the snow storm in question. When the weather turned colder * * * the accumulated water froze, leaving a sheet of ice. It is [Ace Suzuki’s] failure to remove this ice that was the cause of my fall and resulting injury.”
Furthermore, we note that while both Ace Suzuki and defendant Ace Suzuki, Inc. filed a notice of appeal from Supreme Court’s decision and apparently both request summary judgment in their brief, only Ace Suzuki formally made a motion for such relief before Supreme Court. Nevertheless, it is apparent from the record that both defendants are virtually indistinguishable and even plaintiffs make no distinction between the two. Accordingly, upon searching the record, we find it appropriate to grant summary judgment dismissing the complaint to both defendants (see, Sherba v Midstate Precast Sys., 230 AD2d 944 ).
Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments have been examined and found to be unpersuasive.
Mercure, Casey, Spain and Carpinello, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, cross motion granted, summary judgment awarded to defendants and complaint dismissed.
Cases cited
- Zima v. North Colonie Central School District 225 AD2d 993 at 994 p. 856
- Boyko v. Limowski 223 AD2d 962 at 963 p. 856
- Gernard v. Agosti 228 AD2d 994 at 995 p. 857
- Simmons v. Metropolitan Life Insurance 84 NY2d 972 p. 857
- Grillo v. New York City Transit Authority 214 AD2d 648 at 649 p. 857
- Sherba v. Midstate Precast Systems, Inc. 230 AD2d 944 p. 857