Majority
Order, Family Court, New York County (Leah
The lengthy litigation history in this matter is documented in the determinations previously issued by this Court (see, Michael K G. v Elsa R., 185 AD2d 174 , lv denied 81 NY2d 704 ; Michael N. G. v Elsa R., 213 AD2d 195 ). The claims raised by the petitioner on his appeal from the August 18, 1995 order regarding the punitive nature of the bail set and his attendant incarceration has been rendered moot by his release (Gucci v Gucci, 213 AD2d 356 , 357, lv dismissed 86 NY2d 778 ). However, issues as to the propriety of the contempt proceeding against petitioner which occurred on August 22, 1995, remain viable (Matter of Bickwid v Deutsch, 87 NY2d 862 ).
The minutes of the August 22, 1995 proceeding and the penalty imposed upon the petitioner demonstrate that the court sought to punish the petitioner for his violation of a court order, where the violation was not committed in the presence of the court (see, Judiciary Law § 753). Pursuant to Judiciary Law § 756, such application shall be noticed, heard and determined in accordance with the procedure for a motion on notice in an action in such court and, the return date shall be no less than ten and no more than thirty days before the time at which the application is noticed to be heard, unless
The remainder of the relief granted by the hearing court in the August 25, 1995 order appealed, consisting of the suspension of petitioner’s visitation rights and issuance of a protective order, was clearly a function of the Family Court’s improper contempt adjudication. Consequently, we remand the matter for a hearing before a different Judge regarding the visitation arrangements in this matter. Pending said hearing, petitioner should be allowed visitation as above indicated. In addition, we find that the hearing court improvidently exercised its discretion granting respondent’s motion to seal the record, made by order to show cause, without affording the petitioner any opportunity to respond. Therefore, in accordance herewith, we remand the matter for consideration of that application after petitioner is given an opportunity to file a response.
In view of this Court’s affirmance of the Family Court’s August 19, 1994 order granting respondent’s motion for temporary relocation (see, 213 AD2d 195 , supra), our initial determination requiring respondent to seek leave of the court for any relocation in excess of three months (see, 185 AD2d, supra,
Cases cited
- Michael N. G. v. Elsa R. 185 AD2d 174 p. 265
- Gucci v. Gucci 213 AD2d 356 at 357 p. 265
- Bickwid v. Deutsch 87 NY2d 862 p. 265
- In re Murray 98 AD2d 93 at 98 p. 266