People v. Mullins

mously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him of two counts each of assault in the first degree (Penal Law § 120.10) and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03) stemming from two separate incidents. He was charged as a principal in one of the incidents and as an accomplice in the other. Because the evidence with respect to the assault in which defendant was charged as a principal was admissible to establish identity and intent with respect to the assault in which he was charged as' an accomplice (see, People v Read, 175 AD2d 602 , lv denied 79 NY2d 863 ), the criminal transactions were properly joined under CPL 200.20 (2) (b). Once the offenses were properly joined, Supreme Court “lacked statutory authority to sever” (People v Bongarzone, 69 NY2d 892 , 895; see, People v Lane, 56 NY2d 1 , 7; People v Christopher, 101 AD2d 504 , 533, revd on other grounds 65 NY2d 417 , rearg denied 65 NY2d 1054 ). We have examined defendant’s remaining contentions and conclude that they are without merit. (Appeal from Judgment of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Meyer, J. — Assault, 1st Degree.)

Present — Denman, P. J., Green, Hayes, Balio and Fallon, JJ.