Berg v. Wilpon

—In an action to recover a finder’s fee in connection with the leasing of certain real property, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Ponterio, J.), dated February 1, 2000, which, after a nonjury trial, is in favor of the defendants and against him dismissing the complaint. The plaintiff’s notice of appeal from a decision of the same court dated May 3, 1999, is deemed a premature notice of appeal from the judgment (see, CPLR 5520 [c]).

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly determined that the subject real property was a dominant feature of the transaction at issue. The plaintiff, who did not have a real estate broker’s license, was therefore barred from collecting a fee for his endeavors, which were in the nature of brokerage services (see,