Majority
—Order unanimously affirmed with costs. Memorandum: This action was commenced to recover damages for injuries sustained by Dean M. Wilkins while working on the construction of an addition at the residence of Jennifer Sands and Richard Sands (third-party defendants). The accident occurred when Wilkins backed into an unprotected opening in the second floor hallway and fell to the first floor. Supreme Court properly granted plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on Labor Law § 240 (1) liability and denied that part of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing that claim. We reject defendant’s contention that Labor Law § 240 (1) does not apply to Wilkins’ fall (see, Becerra v City of New York, 261 AD2d 188 , 190; Nowak v Kiefer, 256 AD2d 1129 , Iv dismissed in part and denied in part 93 NY2d 887 , rearg dismissed 93 NY2d 1000 ; Negroni v East 67th St. Owners, 249 AD2d 79 , 80). Plaintiff established as a matter of law that the violation of Labor Law § 240 (1) was the proximate cause of the accident (see, Felker v Corning Inc., 90 NY2d 219 , 225) and that defendant is liable for that violation as the general contractor on the project (see, Dennis v Beltrone Constr. Co., 195 AD2d 688 , 689; Kenny v Fuller Co., 87 AD2d 183 , 186-189, Iv denied 58 NY2d 603 ). Defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The court properly denied that part of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 241 (6) claim (see, Frank v Meadowlakes Dev. Corp., 256 AD2d 1141 , 1142; Riley v Stickl Constr. Co., 242 AD2d 936 ; Mazzu v Benderson Dev. Co., 224 AD2d 1009 , 1011) and the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims (see, Ross v CurtisPalmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494 , 506; Houde v Barton, 202 AD2d 890 , 891-892, lv dismissed 84 NY2d 977 ).
The court also properly granted that part of the motion of third-party defendants seeking summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint. Third-party defendants established as a matter of law that they are entitled to the homeowner’s exemption under Labor Law § 240 (1) and § 241 (6) (see, Slettene v Ginsburg, 257 AD2d 656 , 657; Lane v Karian, 210 AD2d 549 , 549-550) and that they are not liable for common-law
Cases cited
- Becerra v. City of New York 261 AD2d 188 at 190 p. 877
- Nowak v. Kiefer 256 AD2d 1129 p. 877
- Felker v. Corning Inc. 90 NY2d 219 at 225 p. 877
- Dennis v. Beltrone Construction Co. 195 AD2d 688 at 689 p. 877
- Kenny v. George A. Fuller Co. 87 AD2d 183 at 186-189 p. 877
- Riley v. John W. Stickl Construction Co. 242 AD2d 936 p. 877
- Mazzu v. Benderson Development Co. 224 AD2d 1009 at 1011 p. 877
- Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Electric Co. 81 NY2d 494 at 506 p. 877
- Houde v. Barton 202 AD2d 890 at 891-892 p. 877
- Lane v. Karian 210 AD2d 549 at 549-550 p. 877
- Beckford v. Canessa 205 AD2d 655 at 656 p. 878
- Itri Brick & Concrete Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 89 NY2d 786 at 795 p. 878
- Velez v. Tishman Foley Partners 245 AD2d 155 at 157 p. 878
- Connolly v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co. 168 AD2d 477 at 478 p. 878