Majority
In an action for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Kramer, J.), entered June 25, 2001, which is in his favor and against the defendants only to the extent of directing the return of the down payment.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
On November 2, 1993, the parties entered into a contract for the purchase of real property in Brooklyn. Closing was scheduled for July 1, 1994, but the parties extended the closing date. The defendants sellers thereafter unilaterally set a time-of-the-essence closing for November 29, 1995, and informed the plaintiff buyer of that date. The plaintiff failed to attend the scheduled closing. Claiming that the defendants were not prepared to close due to the property’s title problems, the plaintiff commenced this action for specific performance. After a non-jury trial, the Supreme Court denied specific performance, but directed the return of the down payment.
The defendants explicitly set the closing for 2:00 p.m. on November 29, 1995, and advised the plaintiff that if he failed to close, he would be considered in default. This constituted clear, distinct, and unequivocal notice that time was of the es
Cases cited
- Savitsky v. Sukenik 240 AD2d 557 at 558 p. 354
- Mohen v. Mooney 162 AD2d 664 at 665 p. 354
- Tom Jones Realty Corp. v. Frick 144 AD2d 451 p. 354
- Zev v. Merman 134 AD2d 555 at 557-558 p. 354
- Zev v. Merman 73 NY2d 781 p. 354
- Shannon v. Simon 128 AD2d 859 at 860 p. 354
- Manzi v. Rossi 113 AD2d 875 p. 354