cannot be provided with an adequate cesspool. Finally, in view of the total area of the plot, the size and nature of the proposed residence and the absence of substantial proof that property values would be impaired, the board’s finding that the granting of the variance would alter the essential character of the area is unsupportable. While it is true that the necessity for a variance herein arises from subdivision by petitioner’s predecessor in interest, it is to be noted that at the time of petitioner’s acquisition of the subject plot there was outstanding a building permit to erect a residence thereon (see
113 Hillside Ave. Corp. v.
Village of Westbury, 27 A D 2d 858 ). Christ, Martuscello and Kleinfeld, JJ., concur; Beldock, P. J., and Munder, J., dissent and vote to reverse the judgment, dismiss the proceeding and confirm appellants’ determination, with the following memorandum: Petitioner, a domestic corporation, is the owner of a vacant parcel of land located in a Residential “A” zone in the Village of Westbury. The minimum area requirement for parcels in that zone is 7,500 square feet, the minimum front yard depth is 30 feet and the minimum width and street frontage is 75 feet. The parcel is an irregular “ pot handle ” shaped plot with an area of approximately 13,600 square feet (almost twice the required minimum area), but with street frontage of only 25 feet. The “pot handle” shape comes from the fact that the parcel is landlocked except for a portion 75 feet by 25 feet (resembling a pot handle) with 25 feet of one of the 75-foot sides fronting on and providing access to the street. This was not always so. The parcel was formerly part of a larger parcel acquired by a brother of one of the two principal owners of the corporate petitioner in 1965. This brother subdivided the larger parcel into three lots and contracted to sell the subject parcel and a contiguous lot to petitioner’s principals. They in turn assigned the contract to petitioner and title was conveyed to it. This contiguous lot, which satisfied both area and frontage requirements and was improved with an existing residence was then sold by petitioner to a third party. A third party also purchased the remaining lot from the grantor-brother. This lot similarly abuts on a portion of the subject parcel, meets area and frontage requirements and is improved with a residence. When this matter was previously before us
(Matter of 113 Hillside Ave. Corp. v.
Zaino, 30 A D 2d 559 ) we remitted it for a new hearing in accordance with the principles of law enunciated in
Matter of Fulling v.
Palumbo (
21 N Y 2d 30 ). (For other litigation involving these parties, see
113 Hillside Ave. Corp. v.
Village of Westbury, 27 A D 2d 858 .) The Special Term determination which we then reviewed was made before the
Fulling case was decided and, like the Special Term determination now under review, annulled the board’s denial of petitioner’s application for an area variance. This new hearing has been held and, in our opinion, the evidence offered thereat supports the board’s action. This evidence shows a radically different factual setting from the one in
Fulling. Here, all the lots in the immediately surrounding area satisfy the zoning requirements. There are no lots even remotely resembling petitioner’s parcel with its above-described “pot handle” and its street frontage of only one-third the required amount. Hence, the Board had a legitimate interest or purpose in restricting the use of petitioner’s property and that was to maintain and preserve the essential character of the area. This interest was specifically recognized in the
Fulling case
(supra, p. 34). Here, petitioner purchased its two lots simultaneously from someone who personally had created the substandard condition. In other words, this was not a situation, as in
Fulling, where the substandard condition was created by rezoning subsequent to acquisition. In this regard, we view the instant case as being controlled by the decision in
Matter of Weinstein v.
Planning Bd. of Vil. of Great Neck (
28 A D 2d 862 , affd.
21 N Y 2d 1001 ). There, this court affirmed a judgment dismissing a petition which sought to annul a determination by the respondent Planning Board disapproving