entered and remained in the premises “with intent to commit crime therein”. (Penal Law, § 140.20.) True,
“ It is the law that recent and exclusive possession of the fruits of crime, if unexplained or falsely explained, will justify the inference that the possessor is the criminal [and that this] rule has most frequently been applied in cases of burglary
(Knickerbocker v. People, 43 N. Y. 177 ) * * * Only half of the problem, however, has been solved when guilty possession fixes the identity of the offender. There remains the question of the nature of the offense. Here again the facts must shape the inference. * * * The problem is a hard one. To solve it we must steadily bear in mind that the inference of guilt to be drawn from possession is never one of law. * * * Other facts may neutralize it, or repel it, or render it so remote or tenuous or uncertain that in a given case we should reject it.”
(People v.
Galbo, 218 N. Y. 283 , 290, 291.) It was established that a third-floor apartment in an apartment building located at 938 Bronx Park South in the City of New York had been the subject of a burglary. An officer, after receiving a
“ burglary in progress ” alarm, apprehended the defendant as he was descending a stairway from the roof of the building. According to the testimony of the officer, the defendant then had possession of a radio and a movie reel, later identified as objects belonging to and kept by the occupant in the burglarized apartment. There was further testimony that the apartment had been entered through a window from the fire escape and that the fire escape furnished access to the roof. But it was also established that, at the time, the defendant was a guest of an occupant of an apartment two floors above the burglarized apartment. According to the testimony of the officer, the defendant said that he had found the radio and reel on the roof. In any event, there was no evidence that the defendant was in the vicinity of the third floor burglarized apartment or on the fire escape leading therefrom; nor was there proof that defendant was unlawfully on the stairs where he was first seen and apprehended. The defendant testified that he had been in the fifth floor apartment of his friend when he heard a noise of breaking glass; that he went out into the hall and started up the stairs to the roof; and that a third person ran by him, up the stairs, and dropped the radio. In his testimony, he denied having possession of the radio and movie reel. Under the circumstances and with due weight given to the testimony of the officer and all the evidence favorable to the People’s alleged case, the People have failed to sustain the burden of establishing the essential elements of burglary in the third degree. Where, as here, an alleged conviction rests on circumstantial evidence,
“ The evidence must be such as to exclude, to a moral certainty, every hypothesis but that of [defendant’s] guilt of the offense imputed to him”
(People v. Woltering, 275 N. Y. 51 , 61). Here, the evidence was not sufficient to duly establish the inference, to the exclusion of any other reasonable explanation under the evidence, that the defendant had actually entered or had been in the burglarized apartment or had participated in the entry thereof. (See
People v.
Namolik, 8 A D 2d 685 ; see, also,
People v. Cleague, 22 N Y 2d 363 ;
People v. Kobryn, 3 A D 2d 132 .) Concur — Kupferman, J. P., Murphy and Eager, JJ.; McNally, J., dissents in the following memorandum: I dissent and vote to affirm. In my opinion, the record reveals the guilt of the defendant was established beyond a reasonable doubt by reason of the following facts: (1) the undisputed fact that the defendant was present in the apartment building located at 938 Bronx Park South at the time of the crime in question; (2) the testimony of both prosecution and defense witnesses that it was possible to go from the fire escape connected to the apartment where defendant resided up to the roof and down another fire escape to the complainant’s window, the window which was broken to gain entrance for the burglary; (3) the observations of the arresting officer