name and reserved to it in accordance with the second sentence of sub-paragraph (g) of paragraph 5. In addition, petitioner contends that the terms of the first and third sentences of subparagraph (g) of paragraph 5 entitle it to commissions for sales made to those on its subscription list by any succeeding contractor. The obligation of providing the public with printed opinions of the courts is a public function over which the State, through the Reporter, retains ultimate control, and no private rights other than those specifically granted by contract accrue to private parties. In the performance of the contract, petitioner was, at all times, performing an obligation of the Reporter for the Reporter. This precludes any claim that the fruits of the efforts expended on behalf of the State, namely the list of subscribers, belong to petitioner. As Special Term stated in
Matter of Williams Press v.
Flavin (
74 Misc 2d 1082 , 1087): “ Article 14 of the Judiciary Law was undoubtedly enacted to insure that the decisions of the appellate courts of this State and the important decisions in the other courts of the State would be accurately reported and readily available on reasonable terms to members of the Bench and Bar, interested public officials and the public generally. It is obviously in the public interest that all of these persons be fully and promptly informed of judicial decisions as they are rendered and the Legislature unquestionably had that objective in mind when it enacted said article 14. The Legislature determined that this duty to inform should ■be discharged, in major part, by employing a private contractor, but it made certain that, at all times, the manner in which the contractor performed its contract would be supervised and controlled by State officials, namely, the State Reporter and the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals. The contractor, at all times, must regard itself as discharging a public duty and, in resolving any ambiguity as to the intention of the parties to such a contract, the public purpose to be served must be regarded as the prime factor.” It is also petitioner’s contention that it is a licensee subject only to State regulation and, as such, has been granted a property right in the subscription list. However, the terms “license” or “licensee” were never used by the parties to describe their relationship, and petitioner has always been referred to as the contractor performing a service for the State and being compensated therefor by the State. Petitioner, by reason of its contract, gained the right to print the Reporter’s manuscript and distribute the printed volumes to the Reporter’s customers. Such a right is in the nature of a contract right to perform a service, not a property right of ownership. Petitioner further contends that the subscription list is entitled to protection as a trade secret. In order to constitute a trade secret, the “secret” information must not be readily available.
(Public Relations Aids v.
Wagner, 37 A D 2d 293 .) The vast majority of the names on the subscription list are members of the Bar whose business addresses are easily determined by referring to various legal directories, and the creation of such a subscription'list could be accomplished by engaging in a concentrated advertising and marketing campaign. Petitioner is not entitled to compensation for the subscription list as a trade secret since such list is not entitled to protection as a trade secret. Petitioner further contends that, even though it is held that it does not own the subscription list, if the contract is awarded to a succeeding contractor, petitioner is entitled to receive commissions as a law book dealer, upon annual renewals of all subscriptions which were originally placed directly with it. To support its contention, petitioner relies upon the provisions of subparagraph (g) of paragraph 5 of the contract for the period 1966 to 1970 claiming that, under a succeeding contractor, petitioner obtains the status of “law book dealer” and,