Rawson v. Austin

Order unanimously modified in accordance with memorandum and as modified affirmed, without costs. Memorandum: We do not find that Special Term’s exercise of discretion was improvident in granting defendants’ motion to open the default judgment. CPLR 5015 (subd [a]) empowers the court which rendered the judgment or order to relieve a party from it upon such terms as may be just. An inherent power not limited by statute is also possessed by the court to relieve a party from a judgment entered on a default (Michaud v Loblaws, Inc., 36 AD2d 1013 ), and in its exercise a court may open its own judgments for sufficient reason and in the furtherance of justice (Ladd v Stevenson, 112 NY 325 ; Godfrey v Dreslin, 47 AD2d 594 ). Respondents presented a sufficient reason to excuse their default and their papers make a sufficient showing of a meritorious defense to the action. Since an opportunity to defend on the merits is in the interest of justice, it should be favored. (Ballard v Billings & Spencer Co., 36 AD2d 71 ; Matter of Mentó, 33 AD2d 650 .) However, in view of the possibility of a lack of insurance coverage, Special Term should have imposed as conditions of the