Fitzgibbons (8 Ed Dept Rep 205), notwithstanding
Matter of Adler (supra), the commissioner did not include remedial reading as one of the specified subjects which was recognized as a special subject tenure area. Special Term placed great weight on the Board of Regents’ regulations which define remedial reading as a special subject tenure area (8 NYCRR 30.8 [a] [13]), and which were adopted subsequent to the Court of Appeals ruling in
Matter of Baer v Nyquist (supra). As Special Term itself concedes, these regulations are prospective in effect only and they are not applicable here. Therefore, Special Term’s reliance on them was totally misplaced. In holding that elementary school guidance counselling had been a traditional special subject tenure area, the Court of Appeals, in
Steele v Board of Educ. (supra), referred to these same regulations, which also define guidance counselling as a special subject tenure area (8 NYCRR 30.8 [b] [2]). However, a reading of
Steele will show that the Court of Appeals relied upon these regulations merely to demonstrate that they reflected a continuation of a traditional policy which had been developed since 1964 by
ad hoc rulings of the Commissioner of Education (see
Matter of Angel, 3 Ed Dept Rep 238;
Matter of Glowacki, 14 Ed Dept Rep 122, 124). In view of the Court of Appeals holding in
Matter of Becker v Board of Educ. (supra), and the Commissioner of Education’s ruling in
Matter of Fitzgibbons (supra), there is not evident or present the long-standing recognition of remedial reading as a special subject tenure area such as existed with respect to guidance counselling. Nor are there present here, as in
Steele, the two additional factors, to wit, the requirement of a special license and a special collective bargaining agent for guidance counselors, upon which the Court of Appeals predicated its recognition of this special subject tenure area. To the extent that the majority’s determination retrospectively recognizes a special subject tenure area in one of the academic core subjects, it offends the intent and spirit of
Matter of Baer v Nyquist (supra). In
Baer the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ nullification of a determination of the Commissioner of Education approving a vertical tenure classification adopted by the Massapequa Board of Education. In
Baer, the school board classified tenure at the junior high school level according to academic subjects. The court, in
Baer, held that the Commissioner of Education could only define tenure area by prospective rule making rather than by
ad hoc retrospective approval of local school district tenure experimentation, and that absent such prospective rule making, tenure was to be granted on the basis of horizontal or grade levels and certain specified subjects of an artistic or vocational nature. The court, in
Baer, stated as follows (p 296, n 1): " 'It is axiomatic that tenure adheres to a particular area of instruction and encompasses all subjects within such area. "Area tenure” is descriptive of tenure at certain grade levels, such as elementary, secondary and kindergarten levels, and also of certain specified subjects, including physical education, music, art and vocational subjects. Apart from these specified subjects, tenure is not granted on the basis of course subjects but is only descriptive of grade level
(Matter of Van Heusen v Board of Education [
26 AD2d 721 ];
Matter of Becker v Board of Education [ 9 NY2d 111 ])’ ”. It is true that since
Baer, the courts have expanded upon the
Baer definition of the "certain specified subjects” which are susceptible to classification as traditional special subject tenure areas. Included in this latter group are the subjects of guidance counselling, driver education and school nurse teaching
(Steele v Board of Educ., supra; Matter of Glowacki v Ambach, 53 AD2d 260 ;
Matter of Mitchell v Board of Educ., 40 NY2d 904 ;
Matter of Bruso v Board of Educ., 53 AD2d 692 ). However, these subjects are clearly distinguishable