the medical center, with full back pay and benefits retroactive to December 31, 1976. The thrust of the petition was that the 1977 contract between the county and Effective masked an employer-employee relationship between the county and Effective’s employees and that the latter had been appointed to the individual petitioners’ civil service job positions in violation of the New York State Constitution, and, in particular, section 6 of article V thereof, which provides, in pertinent part: "Appointments and promotions in the civil service of the state and all of the civil divisions thereof, including cities and villages, shall be made according to merit and fitness to be ascertained, as far as practicable, by examination which, as far as practicable, shall be competitive”. In granting the petition, the Special Term adopted petitioners’ arguments, directed that the individual petitioners be reinstated and declared that their positions as watchmen had been abolished in "bad faith”. We disagree with the conclusion reached by the Special Term. It is well settled that municipal subdivisions of the State are free to contract with private industry for the rendition of work and services and that section 6 of article V of the State Constitution does not require that all services provided to a county be performed by persons directly employed by it
(Matter of Corwin v Farrell, 303 NY 61 , 66). A contract for the provision of services by the private sector to the government can be challenged as violative of section 6 of article V of the Constitution only where the private contracting party’s employees are not independent of the government, but are controlled and supervised by government officials
(Matter of Corwin v Farrell, supra). In
Corwin, tenured competitive civil service employees were discharged by the New York City Housing Authority after that authority contracted with a private corporation for the performance of the same title examination services which the civil service employees had previously been performing. In dismissing the government employees’ challenge to the legality of their dismissal and the propriety of the contract, the Court of Appeals specifically held (p 66) that "neither constitutional mandate nor statutory enactment requires that all services furnished or all labor performed for a governmental agency must be supplied by persons directly employed” by it. The Court of Appeals, in
Corwin, stressed that the contract had to be analyzed to determine whether it was a normal contract entered into by the government with an independent contractor, or a subterfuge to conceal an employer-employee relationship between the
government and the contractor’s employees. In
Corwin the court noted that the authority did not (1) select, control or even approve the officers or employees of the contractor; (2) fix their compensation or hours of work; or (3) engage them exclusively or restrict them from engaging in their regular business with anyone they chose. These facts, and the numerous demonstrable advantages which flowed to the authority by virtue of the contract, including a substantial savings of money, led the court in
Corwin to uphold the contract therein. Moreover, the court in
Corwin upheld the validity of the contract despite the existence of a three-day termination notice provision and a provision giving the authority the right to make reasonable directions or requests incidental to the performance of the contract. In applying the holding of
Corwin to the facts at bar, it is clear that the contract herein did not mask an employer-employee relationship between the county and the private security guards. Initially, it should be noted that, under
Corwin, it is of no moment that the duties performed by the employees under the private contract are identical to the duties performed by the terminated governmental employees. The key question to be resolved is the extent of control exercised by the county over the private contractor’s employees. Although the duties of the private