Suffolk County National Bank v. State

had not changed, and relied on certain comparable parcels with no direct access. After proper adjustments, the court found the after-taking value to be $822,800 (329.114 acres at $2,500 per acre). He awarded $329,100 in damages. We affirm the judgment in all respects. The State argues on this appeal that the Court of Claims erred when it found that Old Quogue Road existed and that it abutted on claimant’s property. Claimant cross-appeals, contending that the award of damages was inadequate. To prove the existence of Old Quogue Road, claimant offered the testimony of Alden W. Young, a respected surveyor in the area, and enhanced his testimony with various ancient records, maps and surveys. The State did not directly contradict claimant’s evidence, but sought to discredit it by raising certain inconsistencies. These inconsistencies did not persuade the Court of Claims that the road did not exist. Nor do they persuade us. The State makes several other legal arguments, alleging first that title to the road rested in abutting land owners and that it was subsequently abandoned by disuse (Highway Law, § 205). The State carries the burden to demonstrate the facts triggering application of section 205 of the Highway Law (City of Cohoes v President, etc., Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 134 NY 397 , 406-407; Hewitt v Town of Scipio, 32 AD2d 734 ). This it has failed to do. In fact, the record would indicate, to the objective observer, that title remained in the Town of Southampton (see Fink v Jagger, 211 NYS2d 51 ). Nor has the State offered proof of an overt act by the town demonstrating abandonment (New York Cent. & Hudson Riv. R. R. Co. v City of Buffalo, 200 NY 113 ; Matter of Fusaro v D’Angelo, 41 AD2d 567 ). By similar proof, claimant established that the road abutted its property, and by similar opposition, the State failed to prove otherwise. We, therefore, find that Old Quogue Road was an extant public highway at the time of the taking (here conceded to be Aug. 14, 1972) and that it did abut on claimant’s property. We can find no error in the Court of Claims’ computation of damages. It was proper to reject claimant’s position that its land retained only nominal value after the taking. Claimant’s own evidence demonstrated rapidly accelerating land values in the area. Land speculation was widespread. The record shows that there was an existing market for claimant’s land. Claimant’s failure to explore that market and present proof of values was properly condemned. We are satisfied that the Court of Claims diligently performed its duty in taking the limited data before it and reaching a fair value for the land. None of the comparables were identical, but they did exhibit the same qualities of limited access. All adjustments were explained and, in our view, were proper. Judgment affirmed, without costs. Greenblott, J. P., Sweeney and Kane, JJ., concur; Mahoney and Larkin, JJ., dissent and vote to reverse in the following memorandum by Mahoney, J. Mahoney, J. (dissenting). We agree with the majority that claimant established a legal access from his property over Old Quogue Road which access was cut off by the State’s taking, leaving the property landlocked. We also agree that the Court of Claims’ determination of the before-taking value of $1,151,900 should be affirmed. However, there is insufficient information in the record to support the $822,800 after-taking value found below. This after-taking value was based on the State’s comparable Sales Nos. 4 and 6. These sales were of nearby property, the access to which had also been cut off by the Sunrise Highway Extension. Despite the absence of any legal access,^[1] these compa