People v. Feliciano

through the entire record and found that he was advised through the interpreter and he knew all of the consequences of admission of his guilt at that time.” Two general principles emerge from the cases which have addressed the issue presented when a defendant seeks to withdraw a plea of guilty on the date of sentence. The first, in its most recent authoritative formulation, requires the trial court to conduct at least a limited interrogation, reserving an evidentiary hearing only for the rare case. (See People v Tinsley, 35 NY2d 926 , 927; cf. People v McKennion, 27 NY2d 671 , 673.) The second principle, which has been variously phrased, in effect vests the trial court with broad discretion to determine whether or not a motion to withdraw the plea should be granted. (See People v Francis, 38 NY2d 150 , 153; People v Nixon, 21 NY2d 338 , 353-355.) It is, I think, a fair observation that the leading decisions have presented only in very general terms the standards by which trial courts are to be guided in the exercise of that broad discretion. (See People v Francis, supra, p 153 .) I believe that the court’s refusal to permit this defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty under the circumstances of this record was an improvident exercise of discretion. It was implicit in defendant’s comments when he entered the plea that he did so, not because he was guilty, but because he was persuaded that he would be convicted after a trial and would receive substantially greater punishment. His response when asked by the court to describe his participation, described above, made it quite clear that his acknowledgement of guilt was one of form only. (Cf. People v Viuda, 61 AD2d 938 ; see, also, People v Serrano, 15 NY2d 304 .) The defendant’s statement on the date of sentence made explicit that which was clearly suggested by his remarks when he accepted the plea. And who can doubt that he would indeed have received a more substantial sentence if he had been convicted after trial. He asserted his innocence with a force and passion that one rarely sees in this kind of application. It is not easy to understand the basis on which the trial court exercised its discretion to deny the application to withdraw the plea. Surely the record does not support a conclusive judgment that this defendant was in fact guilty of the crime charged. So far as appears, the evidence against him consisted exclusively of identification testimony from witnesses who did not know prior to the robbery any of the participants. Although many robbery cases depend on such testimony, and identification testimony is often reliable, its occasional vagaries are too well known to require amplification. Moreover, in this case an eyewitness testified that although the defendant resembled one of the robbers, he definitely was not involved in the robbery. By itself, that testimony raised a substantial question of fact as to defendant’s guilt. In addition, the testimony of the Wade witnesses established that a number of persons other than those who testified were present when the robbery occurred. The record discloses no information as to whether any of these persons had been spoken to by the police, had seen pictures of the defendant and others, had identified, not identified or expressed an inability to identify, the defendant. At bottom the issue here, and in many other cases, involves a tension between two principles. One is the natural desire of busy trial courts, once a plea has been entered, to be done with the matter and go on to other cases. The other principle was given appropriate expression by former Chief Judge Breitel in People v Nixon, 21 NY2d 338 , 354, (supra): "It is not tolerable for the State to punish its members over protestations of innocence if there be doubt as to their guilt”. That principle was violated here. The judgment of conviction should be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court so that the defendant may have the trial he so ernestly requested.