p. 666Jesus Gonzalez et al., Respondents, v Texaco, Inc., et al., Appellants.In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated October 18, 1978, which granted plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend the complaint by increasing the ad damnum clause and for leave to serve a supplemental bill of particulars. Order affirmed, with $50 costs and disbursements. Special Term was warranted in granting the motion to, inter alia, increase the ad damnum clause in view of the fact that it was only after the trial on the issue of liability that the hip replacement operation became necessary. Lazer, Gulotta and Shapiro, JJ., concur.
dissents and votes to reverse the order and to deny the motion, with the following memorandum, in which Damiani, J. P., concurs: After liability had been established in favor of plaintiffs in a bifurcated trial in this negligence action, and with full prior knowledge of the severity of
p. 668resist any attempt by Texaco to bring them into the action at this thirteenth (not eleventh) hour. Not strictly in point but of interest on the question of demand for damages is the commentary of David Siegel, Esq., in his discussion of CPLR 3025 (Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR 3025:18 [Post-Verdict Amendment to Raise Demand Sum], p 488). Anent the amendment of the demand clause before the verdict, he noted that "At that stage it is permissible, albeit with varying degrees of proof required”. He then added: "The attempt to raise the monetary demand by an amendment of the wherefore clause
after the verdict
[on damages] comes [in] is a horse of a different color. That one involves subdivision (c), not (b), of CPLR 3025 and the courts have shown surprising rigidity against such an amendment. The matter is thoroughly discussed in Commentary C3017:7 on McKinney’s CPLR 3017, to which the reader is referred. Its moral will come home quickly: that it is indispensable in New York practice to see that the complaint, especially a personal injury complaint, initially demands so great a sum as to cover all conceivable contingencies” (bracketed material supplied). Finally we note the caveat expressed in
Walter v Le Cesse Corp. (
54 AD2d 1136 ): "Where a case has long been certified as ready for trial, judicial discretion in allowing amendments should be 'discrete
[sic], circumspect, prudent and cautious’.” There the court reversed an order of Special Term which,
inter alia, permitted an increase in the
ad damnum clause and an amendment of the bill of particulars two and one-half years subsequent to the happening of the accident, not almost seven as in the case now before us.