Charles S. Wilson Memorial Hospital v. Axelrod

therefore, modified the word "services” and not "charges” and was intended to freeze the "services” and not the "charges” for such services; that the statute would have to be applied retroactively to freeze charges as of May 1, 1978; and that such retroactive application should not be made without an express or implied legislative declaration of statutory intention (Coffman v Coffman, 60 AD2d 181 , 188); and that retroactive application could impair the plaintiff’s existing contractual rights established as of May 29, 1978 and thereby risk a declaration of unconstitutionality (US Const, art I, § 10, cl 1). The legislative intent of the enactment is clearly expressed (L 1978, ch 517, § 1): "Quality hospital care must be accessible to all people of the state of New York at reasonable cost. To insure that past efforts of the legislature to curtail burgeoning hospital costs are not rendered ineffectual * * * and to provide for containment of hospital charges increases to all persons with or without health insurance and to protect the health and welfare of the people, the legislature hereby adopts this act.” The object of this stated intent is the containment and curtailment of hospital charge increases. When such intention is so clearly expressed, the primary consideration of the courts is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislative enactment (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, § 92, subd a; § 97) despite grammatical inaccuracies and other inconsequential errors and inconsistencies. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention and the decision of Special Term, whose interpretation was selected for its grammatical accuracy, the clearly expressed intent of the Legislature was to contain "hospital costs”, and in order to accomplish such a purpose the May 1 date should be held to modify "charges for in-patient care services” and not "services” only. "Charges for in-patient care services” must, therefore, be frozen at the May 1, 1978 level. This conclusion does not mean that the amendment must be applied retroactively which, without any express or implied expression of retroactivity, would violate the axiom that statutes are presumed to "operate prospectively unless there is a clear legislative intent to make them operate retrospectively” (Kinney v Kinney, 48 AD2d 1002 ). If all the language of a law can be satisfied by giving it a prospective operation only, it should not apply retrospectively. Accordingly, a statute should not be given a retroactive effect when it is capable of any other construction. (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, § 51, subd a.) Lacking legislative indication of retroactivity, the statute speaks as of its effective date, July 24, 1978, and applies to and affects only the charges incurred on and from July 24, 1978 through December 31, 1978, freezing such charges at the May 1, 1978 rate level. All contracts negotiated between those dates are subject to the provisions of section 2807 (subd 2, par [i]) of the Public Health Law. Charges incurred and contracts negotiated from May 29, 1978 to July 24, 1978 are unaffected by the amendment. The other contentions of the defendant have been considered and are without merit. Accordingly, the determination of Special Term should be modified to declare that all charges, including contracts therefor, occurring on or after July 24, 1978 and prior to January 1, 1979 are subject to the provisions of section 2807 (subd 2, par [i]) of the Public Health Law. Judgment modified, on the law, in accordance with this decision, and, as so modified, affirmed, without costs. Greenblott, J. P., Sweeney, Kane, Staley, Jr., and Casey, JJ., concur.