copy of a letter from the Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, to the defendant dated June 9,1980 and a copy of the department’s investigative report dated June, 1980. The letter states in part: “The information which this agency has developed or received concerning inadvertent rearward movement of Ford vehicles equipped with automatic transmissions indicates that all Ford vehicles built between September 1,1969 and October 31, 1979, and equipped with C-3, C-4, C-6, FMX or JATCO automatic transmissions, contain one or more defects in design, construction, or performance.” According to the report, inadvertent rearward movement occurred when a car operator believed that the gear selector lever had been placed in the park position, but the pawl of the transmission was not secure in the park position and would slip into the reverse position. The investigative report also reveals that defendant made some design changes in its 1980 models to correct the problem. The proof presented on the motion showed dissimilarities in each of the four types of transmissions and thus Special Term’s order properly limited the scope of the interrogatories to the C-4 type transmission (see
Bertocci v Fiat Motors of North Amer., 76 AD2d 779 ;
Johantgen v Hobart Mfg. Co., 64 AD2d 858 ). It was improper, however, to limit disclosure to the years from date of manufacture to date of accident (see
Johantgen v Hobart Mfg. Co., supra). While disclosure for these purposes should not include the 1980 model because of the dissimilarity of the C-4 transmission resulting from the design changes, it is obvious that defendant and the Department of Transportation have compiled records and made studies for the years 1970 through 1979, and information as to those years would be necessary, material and useful to plaintiff in the preparation of her case
(see Allen v Crowell-Collier Pub. Co., 21 NY2d 403 .) As to interrogatories numbered “11” and “12”, defendant argues that the 1980 postaccident design changes will be inadmissible. The admissibility of this evidence will be dependent upon the purpose for which it is offered and will be a question which the trial court must decide (cf.
Rainbow v Elia Bldg. Co., 79 AD2d 287 , affd
56 NY2d 550 ;
Bolm v Triumph Corp., 71 AD2d 429 ). For purposes of discovery, however, it is sufficient if the material sought bears on the controversy and will assist in preparation for trial. “The test is one of usefulness and reason.”
(Allen v Crowell-Collier Pub. Co., supra, p 406.) Applying that test, we conclude that plaintiff is entitled to disclosure of the 1980 postaccident design changes
(see Hawkins v Genesee Hosp., 86 AD2d 971 ). The order is modified by deleting therefrom decretal paragraph “3”; by substituting the words “from 1970 through 1979” for the words “from 1974 through 1978” in decretal paragraphs “1”, “5”, “7” and “8”; by deleting from decretal paragraph “2”, the words “prior to October 1, 1978, the date of the accident involved in this litigation”; by deleting from decretal paragraph “9” the words “prior to October 1,1978” and by substituting the words “from 1970 through 1979” for the words “from 1974 through 1978” in said paragraph; and by substituting the words “after October 1,1977” for the words “between October 1,1977 and October 1, 1978, the date of the accident involved in this litigation” in decretal paragraph “10”. (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Wagner, J. — protective order.) Present — Dillon, P. J., Callahan, Boomer, Moule and Schnepp, JJ.