that plaintiff and his family incurred medical expenses of “forty six thousand plus dollars * * * to date”, this was not evidence which the jury could consider. Special Term found that plaintiff’s carefully designed questions relating to medical expenses paid during the past 12 months terminated upon defendant’s objection and that no further offer or proof of medical expenses was made. Finally, in its charge, the trial court specifically instructed the jury that its verdict was to “compensate plaintiff for all injuries, conscious pain and suffering incurred” and that he was “not entitled to receive any loss of earnings or any loss of capacity of earnings in the past. It must only be in the future”. Defendant relies upon the statutory language that it
“shall have a lien against
any recovery” (Insurance Law, § 673, subd 2; emphasis added), and cites
Acevedo v G.E.I.C.O. ( 87 AD2d 600 ,
supra). The law on this issue, however, is clear.' The purpose of the statutory lien is solely to prevent the possibility of a double recovery for basic economic loss by a covered person who has received first-party benefits
(Acevedo v G.E.I.C.O., 87 AD2d 600 ,
supra; Matter ofCelona v Royal Globe Ins. Co., 85 AD2d 635 , 636;
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 61 AD2d 1122 ,1123;
Royal Globe Ins. Co. v Connolly, 54 AD2d 1117 , 1118). It is equally clear that an insured will not be forced to repay no-fault benefits received for his basic economic loss out of his recovery for pain and suffering
(Matter ofCelona v Royal Globe Ins. Co., supra, p 636;
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v Stuyvesant Ins. Co., supra, p 1123;
Scinta v Kazmierczak, 59 AD2d 313 , 316). Only in the event the award duplicates benefits provided by an insurance carrier under the no-fault provisions of the law may an award be reduced by the sum of the no-fault benefits
(Rabideau v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 54 AD2d 1055 ). The issue to be resolved is whether the jury verdict included basic economic loss or whether it was solely compensation for the injuries and conscious pain and suffering. The resolution of this question of fact must be made by a court
(Matter of Ackerman [Forbes], 66 AD2d 1027 ;
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v Stuyvesant Ins. Co., supra, p 1123). In a similar factual situation, the Court of Appeals, in refusing to vacate an arbitrator’s award which found that basic economic loss was not incorporated into the jury’s verdict, held that “[sjince the plaintiff sought a sum greatly in excess of $180,000 [the verdict] for the objective, permanent injuries * * * it is not inconceivable that the jury, in arriving at its compromise figure may have decided not to include the no-fault items in its own computation of damages”
(Matter of Levine [Zurich Amer. Ins. Co.], 49 NY2d 907 , 908). We hold that Special Term correctly found that the limited references to plaintiff’s medical expenses, none of which were in evidence for jury consideration, taken with the specificity of the jury charge, compel the conclusion that no part of the verdict represented a recovery for plaintiff’s basic economic loss. Plaintiff will, therefore, not enjoy a double recovery for such loss and defendant may not assert a statutory lien
(Matter of Adams [Government Employees Ins. Co.], 52 AD2d 118 , 120,
supra). We find defendant’s remaining arguments unpersuasive. We see no analogy between this case and
Pavone v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (91 Mise 2d 658), where a plaintiff was held to be equitably estopped from inconsistently denying coverage in order to defeat the carrier’s statutory lien for no-fault benefits paid to her. Furthermore, the rule prohibiting double recovery is not restricted in its application to cases involving two separate indorsements in an insurance policy designed to compensate for different types of damages (see, e.g.,
Matter of Celona v Royal Globe Ins. Co., 85 AD2d 635 ,
supra; United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 61 AD2d 1122 ,
supra, neither of which involved separate policy indorsements). Finally, defendant’s reliance upon
Matter of Granger v Urda ( 44 NY2d 91 ) is misplaced. There, an injured employee was paid for lost wages and medical expenses by