defendant’s motion to vacate the search warrant and suppress the evidence seized pursuant to that warrant was denied, he pleaded guilty to criminal possession of marihuana in the first degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree, and was sentenced to a three-year term of imprisonment. The issue in this appeal is the sufficiency of the supporting affidavit upon which the warrant was issued. At the outset, we note that the court failed to fix a minimum term of imprisonment as required by law (Penal Law, § 70.00, subd 3, par [b], eff Sept. 1,1980). Although the issue is not raised in either brief, we conclude that the matter should be remitted for resentencing in compliance with the statute (CPL 470.15, subd 2, par [c];
People v Haynes, 88 AD2d 1070 , 1071;
People v Van Burén, 87 AD2d 900 ). Defendant contends that the search warrant application failed to satisfy the two-prong test governing the use of hearsay enunciated in
Aguilar v Texas (
378 US 108 ). We disagree. When probable cause is predicated upon hearsay information obtained from an informant, the magistrate issuing the warrant must be informed of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that there was criminal activity and which establish the informant’s reliability
(Aguilar v Texas, supra, p
114 \People v Brown, 40 NY2d 183 ;
People v Wheatman, 29 NY2d 337 , 344). Where as here, the informant’s identity is disclosed to the magistrate and he has made statements obviously against his own penal interest describing in detail his recent purchases of marihuana from defendant at the premises to be searched, a sufficient basis for the informer’s reliability exists
(United States v Harris, 403 US 573 ;
People v Hardwood, 90 AD2d 923 ;
People v Wolzer, 41 AD2d 679 , 680). Moreover, since the information was gleaned from personal observations, the information, if credible, provided sufficient “basis of knowledge” to establish probable cause
(People v Brown, 40 NY2d 183 ,186,
supra). In our view, the application was sufficient to justify issuance of the warrant. Next, defendant contends, and the People concede, that the warrant application failed to include a statement of reasonable cause as required by CPL 690.35 (subd 2, par [b]). The People urge, however, that the application was in substantial compliance with the statutory requirement and that the error was harmless. We agree. The warrant application should not be read in a hypertechnical manner, but must be considered in light of everyday experience and allowed all reasonable inferences
(People v Hanlon, 36 NY2d 549 , 559). The obvious purport of the affidavit was that either marihuana or other controlled substances would be found at defendant’s residence or on his person. This is particularly evident since the illegal transactions described in the affidavit occurred at the Bowers’ residence. We also note that the affidavit’s “wherefore clause” requested a search of defendant’s person and “anyone present at the subject premises reasonably believed to possess controlled substances and/or marihuana”. In our view, since there was an appearance before a magistrate and substantial compliance with statutory formality, the warrant should be upheld
(People v Brown, 40 NY2d 183 , 185-186,
supra; People v Johns, 41 AD2d 342 , 344-345). Finally, the record shows that after the warrant was executed, one of the police officers asked if defendant objected to a search of his vehicle and defendant responded “No, what difference does it make, now”. Defendant refuted this statement, contending that he merely acquiesced to perceived police authority under duress. The issue of consent presents a question of fact and credibility for the suppression court to resolve. Although defendant was in handcuffs, there is nothing to suggest he was coerced into authorizing the vehicle search. Viewing all the circumstances, we find the consent voluntary and the resulting vehicle search valid. Judgment modified, on the law, by vacating the sentence imposed and by remitting to the County Court of Chenango County for resentencing,