Majority
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Village Board of the Village of Spring Valley denying an application for a special use permit, the appeal is from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Cerrato, J.), dated September 30, 1981, which granted the petition, annulled the determination and directed the appellant to issue the permit. Judgment affirmed, with costs. No opinion. Weinstein, Thompson and Rubin, JJ., concur.
dissents and votes to reverse the judgment appealed, from, confirm the determination and dismiss the proceeding on the merits, with the following memorandum: The petitioner, a partnership, is the owner of a commercial shopping center located at the intersection of Kennedy Boulevard and Route 59 in the Village of Spring Valley. On or about October 1, 1980, a supermarket located in the shopping center was destroyed by fire. Rather than restore the building to its former use, petitioner decided to build a structure containing several retail stores and three mini theaters. In April, 1981, petitioner submitted to the Village Board of the Village of Spring Valley an application for a special use permit pursuant to section 417 of the Spring Valley zoning ordinance. On July 7,1981, a public hearing was held before the board. At the close of the hearing, the board unanimously voted to deny the application for a special use permit, setting forth various reasons primarily involving increased traffic congestion. It is not clear whether that determination, while made on the record at the meeting, was ever reduced to a written decision. Nonetheless, by order to show cause dated August 4, 1981, this proceeding was commenced. In its verified answer, the Village of Spring Valley asserted, as an affirmative defense, the reasons the board denied petitioner’s application as follows: “tenth: That the Village Board may recommend the issuance of a special permit pursuant to section 418.Q4 of the Zoning Code of the Village of Spring Valley * * * provided, it shall find that áll of the following conditions and standards have been met in Section 418.04, Subdivisions (a) through (d). eleventh: That the petitioner fails to meet the qualifications of Section 418.04 (a), in that, the nature of the use, times of operation and nature of ingress are such that considerable congestion, noise and safety problems will be created and will result in disharmony in the orderly development of the area in which it is located, twelfth: That the petitioner fails to meet the qualification of Section 418.04 (c), in that, the intended use will be objectionable, in that, it will create at exact times increased volume of noise and emission of fumes from vehicles for this use, than would be a use not requiring a special permit, thirteenth: That the petitioner fails to meet the qualifications of Section 418.04 (d), in that the proposed use will require parking far in excess of a non special permit use, since the intended use adheres to exact time schedules requiring space for those currently enjoying
Dissent
Cases cited
- North Shore Steak House, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of the Incorporated Village of Thomaston 30 NY2d 238 at 243 p. 442
- Tandem Holding Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Hempstead 43 NY2d 801 at 802 p. 442, p. 443
- Wen & Liz Realty Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals 94 AD2d 182 p. 442
- Lemir Realty Corp. v. Larkin 11 NY2d 20 at 24, at 25 p. 442, p. 443