People v. Chavis

3:30 p.m., he received a report that a robbery had just occurred. This report indicated that the suspects were two black men, traveling in a 1973 to 1975 brown Ford Torino, plate number 877-WW. Around 3:35 p.m., Hague spotted a gold 1973 or 1974 Ford Torino traveling south on Route 434. He noticed that, although the vehicle was dirty, the plates were clean. Hague radioed an Officer Gary and proceeded to follow the vehicle. The vehicle made several traffic violations. After Hague and Gary gave chase, the driver lost control of the vehicle, which eventually became stuck in a snow bank. Three men emerged from the vehicle, at which point Hague placed them under arrest. The driver of the car was defendant. Upon their arrest, the suspects were handcuffed and placed in police cars. The police then made a brief search of the suspect vehicle and discovered a brown case, which they opened, and discovered a large amount of wrapped cash. Defendant was subsequently indicted on the charge of robbery in the second degree in violation of subdivision 1 of section 160.10 of the Penal Law. At trial, defendant asserted that he was unaware that his companions had robbed the bank. The jury found defendant guilty and this appeal ensued. Defendant initially contends that the money found in the car he was driving was not properly admitted into evidence because there did not exist probable cause to arrest him or the passengers of the automobile (see People v Langen, 60 NY2d 170 ). In our opinion, when the police, minutes after the robbery, spotted the vehicle which essentially matched the description of the getaway car, they possessed reasonable cause to stop the car and arrest the occupants, particularly where the car was being driven in a reckless manner. We find the discrepancies relied upon by defendant insufficient to eliminate probable cause in this case. The fact that the car contained three occupants, where the radio report had mentioned only two robbers, is not significant and hardly surprising since the third individual would likely have been used to drive the getaway car. The fact that there was confusion over whether the car was brown or gold is inconsequential since people could reasonably describe a gold car as a shade of brown. The only other discrepancy was the alleged fact that the stopped car had a license plate number that matched the reported number in only three of six digits. Defendant asserts that the actual license number was 871-UVM rather than the 877-VVM reported. Given the timing of events, such a discrepancy does not appear surprising. The simple fact is that the police stopped a car that substantially met the description of the getaway car. Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in permitting evidence indicating that he was present at a prior bank holdup in the City of Utica conducted by codefendant Rodney Porter. It is well established under the Molineux rule that the People may not introduce evidence of uncharged crimes to prove that a defendant was predisposed to commit a crime for which he is being tried (People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 ; see, also, People v Beam, 57 NY2d 241 , 250). Among the exceptions to the Molineux rule, however, is proof relevant to a defendant’s state of mind (People v Lisk, 76 AD2d 942 , 943). It is not disputed that defendant’s state of mind was at issue in this case. Accordingly, the trial court correctly permitted evidence of defendant’s participation in a prior robbery to prove his state of mind (id.). Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in refusing his request to charge criminal facilitation in the fourth degree (Penal Law, § 115.00, subd 1)^[1] as a lesser included offense of accomplice liability (Penal Law, § 20.00) for robbery in the second degree. To resolve this issue, we must apply the two-pronged test outlined by the Court of Appeals in People v Glover ( 57 NY2d 61 ), which instructs us that to demonstrate entitlement to a lesser included offense charge, the defendant must