which had been commenced by the police officers against two insurance companies. The maximum potential recovery against the insurance companies was $460,000. On or about August 11,1977, these settlements were approved by the United States District Court. The medical malpractice claim was dismissed for lack of diversity jurisdiction, without prejudice to commencement of a medical malpractice action in State court. A medical malpractice action was subsequently commenced in Supreme Court, Sullivan County, and it was settled on May 16, 1979 for the sum of $287,500. The action for a declaratory judgment is apparently still being litigated. On October 7, 1977, plaintiff Jerome Edelman initiated a motion in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York requesting,
inter alia, a hearing to fix the respective fees for plaintiffs and defendants with regard to the Sanabria litigation. The matter was referred to United States Magistrate Harold Raby, who conducted a full evidentiary hearing. Plaintiff's produced at the hearing all of the files prepared in connection with the Sanabria litigation. It is noted that at the time plaintiffs were dismissed as trial counsel, all of Sanabria’s claims, including those for medical malpractice and those against the six individual police officers, were still pending in the United States District Court. It is further noted that plaintiffs submitted proof with regard to all of the work performed, and covering all claims against all of the defendants, even though the only claim that had been finally resolved at the time of the submission was the one against the Village of Monticello. Plaintiff Jerome Edelman, who had acted as the primary trial counsel, was unable to estimate the number of hours he had worked on the case. Magistrate Raby recommended that Edelman be awarded a total of $2,500 in attorney’s fees and $500 in disbursements for his services. The computation was based on the Magistrate’s findings that Edelman performed no more than 50 hours of work as trial counsel, and the value of the work was $50 per hour. The Magistrate’s findings were confirmed and adopted by United States District Judge John M. Cannella on October 2, 1978. Judge Cannella’s order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on February 28,1979. The instant action was commenced in July, 1979. Plaintiffs sought further recovery with regard to the services performed as trial counsel for defendants with regard to the Sanabria case. Defendants then initiated a motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground of
res judicata. Special Term concluded that the Federal courts’ determinations were final and conclusive determinations of Edelman’s claim for attorney’s fees with regard to all of the services rendered for all aspects of the Sanabria litigation, despite the fact that it was made at the time when the only final resolution of the claims being pursued was the $40,000 settlement with the Village of Monticello. Special Term concluded that the instant action was therefore barred under the doctrine of
res judicata. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was granted. We affirm. The determinations of the Federal courts were that Edelman expended, at most, 50 hours in connection with the Sanabria litigation. These decisions were reached after the courts considered all of the services rendered by plaintiffs with regard to the Sanabria case. Pursuant to the transactional analysis approach applied in deciding
res judicata issues of this nature
(O’Brien v City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d 353 , 357;
Matter of Reilly v Reid, 45 NY2d 24 ), the Federal determinations brought plaintiffs’ claim for attorney’s fees to a final conclusion, and served as a bar to all other claims for attorney’s fees arising out of the same transaction. “[T]he same foundation facts serv[ed] as a predicate” for both the instant action and the Federal proceeding to set Edelman’s fees
{Matter of Reilly v Reid, supra, p 30 ). Hence, the instant action is barred under the doctrine of
res judicata, and the motion for summary judgment was properly granted. Plaintiffs’ reliance on
Matter of