degree, the felony, be charged whenever the method of coercion was to instill a fear of injury to a person or damage to property. Making the misdemeanor offense ‘all-inclusive’ is apparently a ‘safety-valve’ feature included in the event an unusual factual situation should develop where the method of coercion is literally by threat of personal or property injury, but for some reason it lacks the heinous quality the Legislature associated with such threats”
(People v Eboli, 34 NY2d 281 , 287). In the instant case, defendant placed a knife against complainant’s abdomen and demanded the money owed. This extortion cannot be viewed as lacking in heinous quality
(People v Pereau, 99 AD2d 591 ). Accordingly, the trial court properly denied defendant’s request to charge grand larceny in the third degree. As a second challenge to his conviction, defendant argues that his conviction of attempted robbery in the second degree was legally impossible in view of the fact that neither of the two codefendants who were jointly tried with defendant was convicted of attempted robbery in the second degree. One was acquitted completely and the other was convicted of attempted robbery in the third degree. The attempted robbery convictions arose out of events which occurred the day following defendant’s extortion of $150 from Holbrook. On that day, defendant and his two codefendants traveled to Holbrook’s residence to collect the remaining $450 owed. Once there, defendant demanded the money. When informed that no money was available, defendant attempted to strike Holbrook with his fist and to stomp on his toes. Police officers, who had been alerted and who had concealed themselves in a bathroom adjacent to the scene of the encounter, then thwarted defendant’s further efforts and no robbery was completed. The trial court charged the jury that, in order to convict any of the defendants, the jury must find that the efforts of that defendant were aided by another actually present. The People took no exception to the charge. Consequently, it is deemed that they waived the alternative charge of attempting to commit a robbery by causing physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime (Penal Law, § 160.10, subd 2, par [a]). Defendant argues that the jury must have found that neither of his codefendants aided him, as evidenced by the fact that one was acquitted and the other was convicted of only attempted robbery in the third degree which did not require the aid of anyone to commit. We agree. The verdict of the jury was inconsistent. By acquitting the codefendants of aiding another (the principal difference between robbery in the second degree and robbery in .the third degree), the jury determined that no defendant aided another in the commission of the crime
(People v Hampton, 92 AD2d 490 ;
People v Fallon, 78 AD2d 659 , 660). Consequently, defendant’s conviction of attempted robbery in the second degree must be reduced to a conviction of attempted robbery in the third degree, which the record does support most completely. As a challenge to the sentence imposed, defendant argues that the presentence report contained information which was prejudicial and scandalous. Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than three years or more than nine years for the grand larceny in the first degree conviction, an indeterminate term of not less than two and one-third years or more than seven years for attempted robbery in the second degree, and one year for unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, the sentences to run concurrently. Defendant has made no showing, nor does the record reveal, that the sentencing court relied on the alleged prejudicial information nor, in fact, that the information was inaccurate. A presentence report may include any relevant information on the history of the defendant (CPL 390.30) and may include history not only of prior offenses for which defendant has been convicted, but even offenses for which he has not been convicted
(People v Wright, 104 Mise 2d 911, 920). As a final issue, defendant contends that the sentence imposed was excessive and overly harsh. This court will not reduce a