People v. Prunier

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Chemung County (Buckley, J.), rendered May 2, 2011, convicting defendant following a nonjury trial of the crime of assault in the third degree.

Based upon her involvement in pulling a woman from a vehicle and beating her, defendant was charged in a felony complaint filed on January 26, 2010. On July 15, 2010, a grand jury returned a four-count indictment that, along with the People’s statement of readiness, was filed in County Court on Friday, July 23, 2010. That same day, the court notified defense counsel that arraignment would occur on August 2, 2010. On Monday, July 26, 2010, defendant and counsel were given notice that her arraignment would occur on July 27, 2010, which it did. County Court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment based upon a violation of her right to a speedy trial. Thereafter, she waived her right to a jury trial and proceeded to a bench trial on stipulated facts. The court found her guilty of assault in the third degree and sentenced her to two weekends in jail and three years of probation. Defendant appeals.^[1]

Although the People filed a statement of readiness on July 23, 2010,^[2] objectively establishing their readiness for trial (see CPL 30.30 [1] [a]; People v Smith, 82 NY2d 676 , 678 [1993]), a statement of readiness will be considered meaningless and the indictment must be dismissed if arraignment within the statutory time period is impossible (see People v England, 84 NY2d 1 , 5 [1994]; People v Gause, 286 AD2d at 559 ). When an indictment has been filed in a matter where a felony complaint is pending and the defendant is out on bail, the superior court must secure the defendant’s appearance for arraignment on the indictment by directing the defendant, “upon at least two days notice to the defendant” and his or her attorney, to appear on a specified date (CPL 210.10 ^[2]). “Thus, a statement of readiness made contemporaneously with the filing of the indictment can be effective to stop the ‘speedy trial’ clock if the indictment is filed at least two days before the CPL 30.30 period ends” (People v Carter, 91 NY2d 795 , 798 [1998] [citations omitted]; see People v Fields, 262 AD2d 793 , 794 [1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 1017 [1999]).

Because Saturdays and Sundays are excluded when calculating two days notice (see General Construction Law § 20), the question becomes whether the arraignment on “at least two days notice” pursuant to CPL 210.10 (2) may be conducted on

Here, although not required, the arraignment did occur within that period. On July 23, 2010, County Court informed defendant’s counsel that the arraignment would occur on August 2, 2010. On July 26, 2010, the court informed counsel that the arraignment date had been changed to July 27, 2010. Although the later communication provided less than two days notice (see CPL 210.10 [2]), the original communication was provided more than two days prior to the actual arraignment. Additionally, defendant and counsel appeared at the arraignment, and defendant did not complain to County Court about the change in date or lack of sufficient notice. Hence, the court did not err in denying defendant’s speedy trial motion.

Rose, J.P, Lahtinen, Spain and Kavanagh, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.