Majority
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Blumenfeld, J.), rendered April 11, 2011, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, making an improper turn, and unlawfully operating or driving a motor vehicle on a public highway, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
“On a motion to suppress physical evidence, the People bear the burden of going forward to establish the legality of police conduct in the first instance” (People v Hernandez, 40 AD3d 777 , 778 [2007]). “ ‘Probable cause does not require proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt but merely information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed or that evidence of a crime may be found in a certain place’ and that the person being arrested committed the crime or offense” (People v Francis, 44 AD3d 788 , 789 [2007], quoting People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417 , 423 [1985]). “That legal conclusion is to be made after considering ‘all of the facts and circumstances together’ ” (People v Francis, 44 AD3d at 789 , quoting People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d at 423 ). “The credibility determinations of the hearing
Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court did not err in denying that branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence consisting of a gun, which was discovered under the center console of the defendant’s vehicle. The evidence at the suppression hearing established that in November 2007, there was an ongoing police investigation concerning the activities of a third party. As part of that investigation, the police had obtained an eavesdropping warrant to monitor the telephone conversations of the third party. On November 6, 2007, the police overheard a conversation between the third party and a man calling from a telephone number with a Maryland area code. During this conversation, the caller stated that he was “on [his] way” to the third party’s “crib”; that he did not want to stay there for a long period of time; and that he had his “slammy” on him. At the suppression hearing, a detective who overhead the conversation, and who subsequently arrested the defendant, testified that, based on his training and experience, he understood the term “slammy” as a reference to a firearm. Within a few minutes thereafter, the defendant arrived at the third party’s house in a vehicle with a Maryland license plate. After having a brief conversation with the third party, the defendant drove away and was followed by the detective, who had set up surveillance outside the third party’s residence. The detective testified that he followed the defendant’s vehicle until the defendant made a right turn without using a signal, at which time the detective conducted a “car stop.” The detective further testified: “[A]s I was approaching [the defendant’s vehicle], I could see him lean toward the center console area. I approached the vehicle. ... I asked for a license, registration, insurance card. He did not produce a valid driver’s license. I asked him to step out of the vehicle. As he stepped out of the vehicle, he was acting in a nervous manner. I placed him under arrest at this time. I placed him in handcuffs and placed him in the back seat of my car. I then went back to the vehicle to the center console area where I observed him lean, and I recovered a firearm.”
As the Supreme Court correctly concluded, the aforementioned circumstances did not provide a basis for a search of the
The defendant’s remaining contentions are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination.
Accordingly, that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence was properly denied. Florio, J.E, Dickerson, Sgroi and Miller, JJ, concur.
Cases cited
- People v. Francis 44 AD3d 788 at 789 p. 654
- People v. Bigelow 66 NY2d 417 at 423 p. 654
- People v. Blinker 80 AD3d 619 at 620 p. 655
- People v. Baliukonis 35 AD3d 626 at 627 p. 655
- People v. Castro 73 AD3d 800 p. 655
- People v. Shackleford 57 AD3d 578 p. 655
- People v. Whyte 47 AD3d 852 p. 655
- Arizona v. Gant 556 US 332 p. 656
- People v. Blasich 73 NY2d 673 at 678-679 p. 656
- People v. Belton 55 NY2d 49 at 55 p. 656
- People v. Galak 81 NY2d 463 at 467 p. 656
- People v. Henderson 57 AD3d 562 at 564 p. 656
- People v. Martin 28 AD3d 583 at 584 p. 656
- People v. Tambe 71 NY2d 492 at 501 p. 656
- People v. Parker 84 AD3d 1508 at 1509 p. 656